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INTRODUCTION

This article draws upon the author's experience as an expert witness in civil resistance cases involving South Africa, Central America
and nuclear weapons. It is dedicated to the incandescent memory of
Lidia Janus. An award-winning actress in her native Poland and accomplished young scholar, Lidia died of brain cancer at the age of
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thirty-two. Zbigniew Herbert, one of Lidia's favorite poets wrote that
there are too few souls for humanity; 'now there is one less soul. A
beautiful comet has flickered across the sky, but she will never fade
into the recesses of memory. To paraphrase the Indian poet Tagore,
when I go from here let this be my parting word, what I have seen
is unsurpassable - I have seen Lidia. Lidia always will be with me
and with all those who loved her. She embodies the promise of what
life can be. We know Lidia is with us and for us in death as she was
in life. This essay is a modest memorial to her brilliant, omnipresent
and magnetic spirit. The energy, passion and intelligence which she
brought to this article will continue to inspire us.
Acts of civil disobedience increased markedly in the United States
over the course of the last several years. Peace and anti-nuclear activists and those who object to governmental policies towards abortion,
AIDS, nuclear power, immigration and the environment all have engaged in acts of civil disobedience. While the nonviolent movements
for change in China and in Eastern Europe received a great deal of
attention and praise, relatively little commentary or discussion is devoted to these domestic protests.'
Some indication of the extent of domestic civil disobedience in the
United States is illustrated by the figures reported by the tabloid The
Nuclear Resister.2 In 1989, 5,500 arrests were made in the United
States and Canada during approximately 150 protests at more than
seventy nuclear and nuclear-related sites.3 Roughly ninety people
served or are serving prison sentences ranging from between two
weeks to seven years in prison, while hundreds of others served lesser
sentences. 4 Between 1983 and 1989, approximately 30,000 people were
arrested in over one thousand separate acts of protest at 340 nuclear
and nuclear related sites. s
This type of activity is a contemporary manifestation of America's
historical tradition of civil disobedience. A central precept of civil
disobedience is that disobedients should plead guilty and accept their
punishment. The disobedient's guilty plea is intended to demonstrate

1. See generally Matthew Lippman, The Right of Civil Resistance Under International
Law and the Domestic Necessity Defense, 8 DICK. J. INT'L L. 349 (1990). Civil disobedience is
the nonviolent violation of the law to protest government policies.
2. Nuclear Resistance 1989, THE NUCLEAR RESISTER (THE NUCLEAR RESISTER, TUCSON, AZ), Jan. 25, 1990, at 1, col. 1. THE NUCLEAR RESISTER records and reports on domestic
and international civil disobedient actions.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. (these figures were calculated from the table included in the article).
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their respect for the political system and commitment to the rule of
law. In the 1960s, however, disobedients increasingly began to seek
legal justifications for their formally illegal acts of protest. These defenses consistently were rejected by the judiciary.
A great deal of the criticism of the United States' involvement and
activities in Vietnam focused on America's alleged breach of international law. This naturally led to international law, including the Nuremberg Principles, being invoked to justify illegal acts of protest against
the Vietnam War. Although unsuccessful, these international law defenses gradually were refined and increasingly were raised by peace
activists in the 1970s and 1980s. These activists also began to characterize their acts of illegal protest as civil resistance rather than as
civil disobedience. This change in terminology was intended to convey
that protesters no longer accepted the validity of domestic law and
sanctions. They argued that they engaged in justifiable actions under
international law which were intended to halt ongoing criminal conduct
by their government. Defense attorneys increasingly began to rely
upon the domestic defense of necessity as the vehicle through which
to raise international law arguments. Although there has been limited
recognition of international law defenses by trial courts, appellate
courts generally rejected all such claims.
This essay traces the evolution of civil resistance in the United
States and argues for judicial recognition of the applicability of the
necessity defense for civil resisters. Initially, the history of civil disobedience in the United States and the theory of Gandhian civil disobedience are outlined. The response of courts in rejecting attempts
to justify such protest activities is then described. Finally, the evolution of the theory of civil resistance is described; and American courts'
rejection of the necessity defense to justify formally illegal acts of
protest is criticized.
Virtually all of the major contemporary case law addressing the
legal application of the necessity defense and international law to justify acts of civil disobedience involve protests against nuclear weapons.
The significance of these cases transcend this particular area. They
establish the basic principles and arguments which will be applied by
courts and contested by defendants in future cases.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES

The original American colonies largely were populated by those
seeking religious freedom. Respect for individuals' religious beliefs
was enshrined in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the assertion of individual conscience against governmental
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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strictures is a persistent theme in United States history. 6 One manifestation of the primacy of individual conscience is the tradition of nonviolent civil disobedience to governmental authority. 7 Gandhi8 and
Tolstoy 9 customarily are viewed as the intellectual progenitors of modern civil disobedience. However, both were profoundly influenced in
the development of their thought by American theoreticians and practitioners of nonviolent resistance. 10
The American tradition of civil disobedience stretches from the
Quakers in Colonial America and the abolitionists in the pre-Civil War
period through the Suffragettes and labor movement in the early twentieth century and the civil rights and anti-Vietnam demonstrators of
the 1960s. 11 A survey of the historical record illustrates that civil
disobedience was a feature of virtually every epoch of American history. It was relied upon by individuals and groups who represented
an array of political ideologies and aspirations.
The Puritans in Massachusetts harshly repressed and prohibited
the Quakers from entering the colony. The Quakers who emigrated
to Massachusetts Bay Colony were subject to whipping, imprisonment,
branding, ear chopping, sale into slavery and execution. Nevertheless,
some Quakers persisted in entering the colony and nonviolently submitted to these draconian punishments.12 Upon mounting the gallows in
1659, the Quaker Mary Dyer proclaimed that if one "must die that
others may live, let me be the one, for if my life were freely granted
by you, I could not accept it as long as my sisters suffered and my
'13
brothers died. For what is life compared to the witness of Truth?
One of the most significant civil disobedience campaigns was undertaken by the nineteenth-century Abolitionists in an attempt to end

6.
7.

U.S. CONST.

See

amend. I.

THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE: ACTIVE NONVIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

(Robert Cooney & Helen Michalowski eds., 1987) [hereinafter
8. See

JOAN

OF CONFLICT

V.

BONDURANT,

(rev. ed. 1988).

9. LEO TOLSTOY, WRITINGS
& R. Sampson trans., 1987).

10.

POWER OF THE PEOPLE].

CONQUEST OF VIOLENCE: THE GANDHIAN PHILOSOPHY

ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND NONVIOLENCE

Staughton Lynd, Introduction, in

NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA:

A

(A. Maude

DOCUMENTARY

HISTORY XV (Staughton Lynd ed., 1966).

11.

See generally POWER OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 7.
12. For a history of the use of the criminal law to repress deviancy in Massachusetts Bay
Colony, see KAI T. ERICKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1966); see also POWER OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 7, at 16-17.
13. Margaret Bacon, Let Me Be the One: Mary Dyer: Witness to Religious Liberty, in THE
UNIVERSE BENDS TOWARD JUSTICE: A READER ON CHRISTIAN NONVIOLENCE IN THE U.S.
9, 12 (Angie O'Gorman ed., 1990).
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the enslavement of African-Americans.14 Henry David Thoreau's famous essay on civil disobedience was written in 1846 after Thoreau
spent a night in jail for refusing to pay six years of unpaid Massachusetts state taxes. 15 Thoreau's refusal to pay taxes and willing
submission to imprisonment were intended to symbolize his opposition
to slavery; and to the Mexican War which he viewed as an imperialistic
effort to extend involuntary servitude. 6
Thoreau wrote that individuals owed an obligation to do what they
viewed as right rather than merely mechanically to obey the law. He
argued that we should be "men first, and subjects afterward. It is
not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for right.
The only obligation which I have a right to assume, is to do at any
time what I think right.' ' 17 Rather than pay taxes and help to support
the government's pernicious policies, Thoreau urged people to act as
"a counter friction to stop the machine."18 Under the present circumstances, Thoreau observed that prison was the "only house in a
slave-state in which a free man can abide with honor. "19 Thoreau urged
others to follow his example and to clog the jails so as to force the
government to emancipate the slaves and to end the war. Thoreau
wrote that a minority "is powerless while it conforms to the majority;
it is not even a minority then; but it is irresistible when it clogs by
' 20
its whole weight.
In January of 1917, Alice Paul, Lucy Burns and other Suffragettes
began a vigil in front of the White House in Washington, D.C. Their
purpose was to pressure President Woodrow Wilson to keep his promise to work for a constitutional amendment which provided women
the right to vote. Despite violent attacks and harassment, the vigil
lasted until May 22, when the police arrested the demonstrators for
obstructing the sidewalk. In all, 218 women were arrested and nearly
100 were imprisoned in harsh conditions. Most of the women were
sentenced to sixty days, but some were imprisoned for up to seven
months for obstructing traffic. While in prison, the women made the

14.

The legal history of Abolitionism is recounted in ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE Ac(1975).
15. Henry David Thoreau, On the Duty of Civil Disobedience, in HENRY DAVID THOREAU,
WALDEN OR, LIFE IN THE WOODS AND ON THE DUTY OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 222, 233
(1960).
16. Id. at 225.
17. Id. at 223.
18. Id. at 229.
19. Id. at 231.
20. Id.
CUSED ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
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first recorded, collective claim for political prisoner status in the
United States. 21 In order to gain recognition for their claim, the imprisoned women refused to work, went on a hunger strike and proclaimed
that "having acted in accordance with the standards of citizenship, we
ask the Commissioners of the District to grant us the rights due
political prisoners. ''
During World War I, some 4,000 conscientious objectors refused
military service. Some 500 ultimately were court-martialed and convicted. Most received between twenty and twenty-five years in prison,
seventeen were sentenced to death (but none actually were executed)
and 142 received life imprisonment (all of whom ultimately were pardoned).- These conscientious objectors received harsh treatment in
prison. In Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, conscientious objectors who
refused to work were thrown into solitary confinement and were manacled to the bars. Two contracted pneumonia and died.- Roger
Baldwin, founder and first Executive Director of the American Civil
Liberties Union, declared himself a conscientious objector and refused
military service. Baldwin was convicted of draft evasion and sentenced
to one year in prison. Baldwin stated at his trial,
I have no bitterness or hate in my heart for any man. Whatever the penalty, I shall endure it, firm in the faith that
whatever befalls me, the principles in which I believe will
bring forth out of this misery and chaos a world of brotherhood, harmony and freedom for each to live the truth as he
sees it.2
Between September 1936 and May 1937, nearly one-half million
workers were involved in sit-down strikes. During these strikes, workers occupied industrial plants in a generally successful effort to compel
employers to recognize and to collectively bargain with the workers'
unions.26 The famous pacifist A. J. Muste, reflecting on his experiences
as a labor organizer, wrote that virtually every significant strike pro-

21.
22.

POWER OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 7, at 58.
Suffragettes, Letters from Prison, 1917, in NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY XV, supra note 10, at 160, 162.

23.
24.
25.

supra note 7, at 44-45.
Id. at 45.
Roger Baldwin, Refuses to Obey the Draft, in INSTEAD OF VIOLENCE: WRITINGS BY
POWER OF THE PEOPLE,

THE GREAT ADVOCATES OF PEACE AND NONVIOLENCE THROUGHOUT HISTORY

(Arthur Weinberg & Lila Winberg eds., 1963)
26. Joel Seidman, Sit-Down, in NONVIOLENCE
supra note 10, at 241 (author's prefatory note).
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vides "inspiring examples of non-resistance under cruel provocation
and victory by 'soul force' alone - victory through patient endurance
of evil and sacrifice, even unto death, for spiritual ends." Muste reported on numerous occasions that he had exhorted strikers "to fold
their arms, not to strike back, to smile at those who beat them and
trample them under horses' feet, and the strikers' response has been
instantaneous, unreserved, exalted. '"During World War II, 6,086 men resisted conscription on religious,
political and ethical grounds and were imprisoned. Pacifist David Dellinger, although eligible for a ministerial deferment, refused to perform
alternative service and was imprisoned. Upon entering prison in 1943,
Dellinger wrote that
there is no choice between going to a camp for conscientious
objectors and going to jail. I have only one choice - my
ministry in response to God. If the government puts me in
jail for following that ministry, that is its choice, not mine.
Then my ministry will be in jail. 8
Imprisoned objectors engaged in continual strikes to protest the poor
conditions and the brutality of the guards and racial discrimination.2
Corbett Bishop went for a total of 426 days without taking food or
water and for 337 of those days maintained a policy of absolute noncooperation with prison authorities. He refused to move from his cot
throughout this period of non-cooperation. Bishop proclaimed that "authorities have the power to seize my body; that is all they can do.
My spirit will be free. 8' 0 Bishop's actions frustrated prison authorities
who, in exasperation, released him a year prior to the expiration of
3
his prison sentence. 1
Following the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, peace
activists devoted themselves to halting the testing of atomic bombs
and weapons. On May 2, 1958, anti-nuclear activists sailed the small
boat, The Golden Rule, into a nuclear bomb test area in the South
Pacific.2 They were arrested and jailed. A month later, the crew
undertook a second protest voyage and again were arrested and impris-

27.
28.

A.J. Muste, Pacifism and Class War (1928), in supra note 13, at 111, 114.
David Dellinger, Statement on Entering Prison, in REVOLUTIONARY NONVIOLENCE

ESSAYS BY DAVE DELLINGER 7, 15 (1971).

29.
30.
31.
32.

POWER OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 7, at 88-107.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id. at 133.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

7

Florida Journal
of International
Law,
Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1990],
FLORIDA
JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL
LAW Art. 2

[Vol. 6

oned for sixty days.3 Albert Bigelow, a World War II naval commander, captained The Golden Rule and explained prior to the ship's
protest voyage that he was
going in the hope of helping change the hearts and minds of
men in government. If necessary, I am willing to give my
life to help change a policy of fear, force, and destruction to
one of trust, kindness, and help . . . I am going because
I have to - if I am to call myself a human being.On December 1, 1953, Rosa Parks, a Black seamstress in a downtown department store, refused to give up her seat on a bus to white
patrons and was arrested. This incident precipitated a boycott of the
Montgomery, Alabama bus system which resulted in the integration
of the transportation system fifty-five weeks following Rosa Parks'
arrest.3 5 The boycott was followed by sit-in demonstrations by those
who sought to desegregate public and nominally private facilities
throughout the South. During 1960, 3,600 demonstrators were arrested
in an eight-month period; and four times that number were arrested
during the same period of time in 1963.36 These efforts were part of
a larger movement which included "freedom rides" throughout the
South designed to desegregate bus and railroad services; voter registration drives to politically enfranchise Blacks; consumer boycotts
against merchants in towns with segregated public facilities; and
marches and demonstrations intended to draw attention to racism and
inequality7 The Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., in his famous 1963
Letter From Birmingham City Jail,3 wrote that "freedom is never
voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed." There "comes a time when the cup of endurance runs over,
and men are no longer willing to be plunged into an abyss of injustice
where they experience the blackness of corroding despair.40 However,
King argued that acts of civil disobedience do not lead to social anarchy.
On the contrary, King contended "an individual who breaks a law that

33.
34.

Id. at 107-108.
Albert Bigelow, Why I Am Sailing This Boat Into the Bomb-Test Area, in CIVIL

DISOBEDIENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE

146, 151-52 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 1969) [hereinafter

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE].
35. POWER OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 7, at 154-56.

36. Id. at 165.
37. Id. at 165-75.
38. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter FromBirmingham City Jail, in CIVIL
supra note 34, at 72.
39. Id. at 76.
40. Id. at 77.
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conscience tells him is unjust, and willingly accepts the penalty by
staying in jail to arouse the conscience of the community over its
injustice, is in reality expressing the very highest respect for law."41
There was open and widespread opposition to the Vietnam War.
In a 1965 Declarationof Conscience Against the War in Vietnam,42
a number of New York peace organizations proclaimed their "conscientious refusal to cooperate with the United States government in the
prosecution of the war in Vietnam."- Those subject to the draft declared their intention to refuse to serve.- The signatories also declined
to participate in the manufacture or transportation of military equipment or to work in the fields of military research and weapons development. 45 The Declaration concluded by encouraging acts of civil disobedience and resistance to halt the flow of American soldiers and
46
munitions to Vietnam.
In a 1967 manifesto, A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority, 47 a
number of Americans declared that "open resistance to the war and
the draft is the course of action most likely to strengthen the moral
resolve with which all of us can oppose the war and most likely to
bring an end to the war."- They pledged to lend support to those
who actively opposed the war by raising funds to hire attorneys,
providing bail and supporting the families of draft resisters. 49 In 1968,
to dramatize their opposition to the Vietnam War, Father Daniel Berrigan, along with several others, destroyed records at a draft office
near Baltimore. Father Berrigan explained that the "time is past when
good men can remain silent, when obedience can segregate men from
public risk, when the poor can die without defense." 5 Those, who
along with Father Berrigan, destroyed draft records "have chosen to
say, with the gift of our liberty, if necessary our lives: the violence

41. Id. at 78-79.
42. Declaration of Conscience Against the War in Vietnam, in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE,
supra note 34, at 160.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 161.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 162.
48. Id. at 164.
49. Id.
50. Daniel Berrigan, A Meditation from Catonsville, in DELIVERED INTO RESISTANCE:
ESSAYS BY DANIEL BERRIGAN, BARBARA DEMING, JAMES FOREST, WILLIAM KUNSTLER,
STAUGHTON

LYND, RICHARD SHAULL; STATEMENTS

WAUKEE FOURTEEN DEFENSE COMMITTEE

OF THE CATONSVILLE

68, 69 (1969) [hereinafter

NINE

MIL-

THE CATONSVILLE

NINE].

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

9

Florida Journal
of International
Law,
Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1990],
FLORIDA
JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL
LAW Art. 2

[Vol. 6

stops here, the death stops here, the suppression of the truth stops
51
here, this war stops here.'
The American tradition of resistance to governmental authority
continues today. On October 20, 1984, the Twelfth General Convention
of the American Lutheran Church adopted a statement on Human
Law and the Conscience of Believers52 by a vote of roughly ninety
percent of the delegates. The statement recognized that Christians
who live in a constitutional democracy, in certain instances, may be
compelled to violate the law as an act of conscientious protest. However, such acts of civil disobedience only should be undertaken as a
"last resort, nonviolently, and with willingness to pay the required
penalty."- The Lutheran General Convention pledged spiritual support
to those Christians who choose in good conscience to break the law
in order to raise the visibility of an important issue or to change the
law.' 4 The statement specifically extended support to conscientious
objectors to military service;- to those in the military who refuse to
use weapons of mass destruction in combat;- to individuals who refused
to pay taxes for weapons of mass destruction or engaged in protests
against the production and deployment of such weapons; 57 and implicitly encouraged congregations to offer sanctuary to undocumented
persons threatened with deportation to life-threatening situations in
their countries of origin. 5A number of observations emerge from this survey of civil disobedience in America. First, civil disobedience is a constant feature of
American life. To adopt a popular aphorism, nonviolent resistance to
governmental authority is as "American as apple pie." Secondly, under
the passion of the moment, disobedients were subjected to severe
penalties. The harm inflicted on disobedients by the criminal justice
system often far overshadows the disruption caused by civil disobedience. Yet, in the long term, civil disobedients invariably were vindicated by having their viewpoint adopted by larger society. Lastly,
acts of nonviolent civil disobedience have proven to be central to the
achievement of social and political reform.

51. Id. at 70.
52. Human Law and the Conscience of Believers: A Statement of The American Lutheran
Church, reprinted in Michael J. Perry, Conscientious Disobedience, 11 HAMLINE L. REV. 1,
22 (1988).
53. Id. at 22.
54. Id. at 22-23.
55. Id. at 39
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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American theorists and practitioners were instrumental in the development of the theory of civil disobedience. Their ideas, strategies
and tactics helped to inspire Mohandas Gandhi who remains the leading
proponent of civil disobedience in modern history.59 Gandhi, in turn,
profoundly influenced contemporary American thinking on civil disobedience.-

III.

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

Mohandas Gandhi is credited with refining the existing theory and
practice of civil disobedience. 61 Gandhi termed his theory Satyagrapha
or Truth-force.62 The practice of Satyagraphainvolves the open, "civil
breach of unmoral statutory enactments. '"
The disobedient's open violation of the law and willing acceptance
of punishment demonstrates the Satyagraphi'srespect for the sanctity
of the rule of law. Their disobedience only is undertaken as a last
resort- and is directed against immoral laws which do not serve the
public welfare, rather than against the entire social and political
order.- Thus, disobedients are reformers, not revolutionaries.In 1922, in India, Gandhi was arrested and convicted of sedition
based upon his writing of three magazine articles critical of the British
colonial regime.67 In his statement to the court, Gandhi proclaimed
that he was morally innocent, but conceded that he was legally guilty;
and requested the judge to impose the harshest possible sentence.

59. See supra note 10.
60. See generally RICHARD GREGG, THE POWER OF NONVIOLENCE (2nd rev. ed., 1966)
(Gregg was an American disciple of Gandhi whose writings had a major impact on American
pacifists).
61. See generally BONDURANT, supra note 8.Gandhi did not provide a single, comprehensive statement of his views. An inquiry into his theory of civil disobedience necessitates an
examination of his multitude of essays and newspaper articles.
62. Mahatma Gandhi, Satyagrapha, Civil Disobedience, Passive Resistance, Non-Co-operation, in NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE 3 (1951).

63. Id. Gandhi distinguished between civil and criminal disobedience. The criminal disobedient or lawbreaker, surreptitiously violates the law and attempts to avoid detection and punishment. In contrast, the civil disobedient openly and nonviolently violates immoral laws. Their
goal is not personal gain, but to benefit the public welfare. Rather than seeking to avoid detection
and punishment, the civil disobedients accept their arrest, guilt and punishment meted out by
the legal system. Id. at 6-7.
64. Id. at 6.
65. Id. at 7.
66.
67.

in

Mahatma Gandhi, Work In Jails, in id. at 60-61.
Mahatma Gandhi, A Plea For the Severest Penalty, Upon His Conviction For Sedition,

THE WORLD OF LAW, THE LAW AS LITERATURE

68.

459-61 (E.London ed., 1960).

Id. at 465.
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Gandhi's request not only symbolized his respect for the rule of law,
but demonstrated his sincere commitment and willingness to suffer
for his cause. Gandhi believed that law should serve a moral purpose. 69
By pleading guilty and requesting the harshest possible penalty, Gandhi implicitly forced the prosecutor, judge, jailer, and the entire colonial regime to examine whether they were able morally to justify and
cooperate in the enforcement of the sedition statute. 70 Through his
insistence on martyrdom, Gandhi transformed the courtroom into a
forum for the examination of personal and societal morality.71
In addition to the acceptance of guilt and punishment, Gandhi practiced the disobedient act in a courageous, but nonviolent fashion. The
disobedient's opponents should be emotionally and intellectually persuaded, rather than physically forced, to accept the disobedient's
views. Since the objective truth is not easily determined, Gandhi argued that there is no justification for harming another in order to
advance one's political goals. This insures that physical harm will not
be inflicted upon innocents to pursue a potentially flawed cause. Thus,
Gandhi wrote that self-suffering is infinitely superior to the infliction
of pain on others.72
The use of violence, according to Gandhi, also invariably leads to
an escalating cycle of retaliation and distracts attention from the disobedient's cause. Violence becomes an institutionalized mechanism for
conflict resolution, and once unleashed, it is difficult to contain. 73 Furthermore, the harming or murdering of an opponent usually does not
eliminate or resolve the grievance which motivated the attack. It only
reduces those against whom it is directed to the status of objects and,
thus, is contrary to the humanitarian values upon which civil disobedience is premised. Gandhi recognized that the use of civil disobedience
may precipitate a violent response. However, Gandhi argued that the
disobedient merely served as a catalyst to bring underlying societal
tensions to the surface. Once brought out into the open, these conflicts
could honestly be confronted and peacefully resolved. 74

69. Gandhi, supra note 62, at 6-7.
70. Gandhi suggested that if the Judge had doubts concerning the propriety of punishing
him that the Judge should resign in order to disassociate himself from Great Britain's colonial
policies. Gandhi, supra note 67, at 465-66.
71. The Judge, conceding that Gandhi's case presented him with a difficult decision, sentenced Gandhi to six years imprisonment. Id. at 460.
72. Gandhi, supra note 62, at 15, 17.
73. Id. at 19.
74. Mahatma Gandhi, To English Friends, in NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE, supra note 62,
at 222.
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Gandhi stressed that the disobedient should develop and express
love towards their antagonists. It is possible, he argued, to ardently
oppose the views of others and yet, to learn to love them as fellow,
human beings. This loving attitude, in combination with the disobedient's willingness to accept abuse and harsh punishment, eventually
penetrates the psychological defense mechanisms of those in opposition. Once having been forced to recognize the disobedient's humanity
and individuality, those in power begin to question their own conduct
75
as well as to reflect upon the justifiability of the disobedient's claims.
Thus, Gandhi viewed civil disobedience as a mechanism for transforming a physical confrontation into an opportunity for emotional and
intellectual communication. 76
Civil disobedience, then, in the view of Gandhi, is an expression
of an entire discipline and lifestyle. Disobedients must purge themselves of anger, hatred, and material and physical desire and must
develop courage and the ability to refrain from retaliation. 77 It takes
courage to eschew violence and to voluntarily challenge immoral laws
through self-suffering. Gandhi argued that it takes more fortitude to
voluntarily absorb than to inflict pain. 7s
Gandhi argued that civil disobedience is a necessary adjunct to any
democratic political system. It is an inherent right of citizens and a
"sacred duty " when the State degenerates into corruption or lawlessness - "a birthright that cannot be surrendered without surrender
of one's self-respect. '79 Civil disobedience is based upon a supreme
belief in the power of disobedients to appeal to and mobilize popular
opinion and to check the abuse of governmental power. The majority
is not invariably correct and virtually all major reforms are due to
actions of a determined minority which have convinced the majority
of the merits of its point of view.8° Gandhi concluded that only those
regimes which fear public opinion will be concerned with curbing the
expression of civil disobedience. 8I
75. Mahatma Gandhi, Satyagraphi'sDuty, in NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE, supra note 62,
at 192-93.
76. In the case of mass campaigns of civil disobedience, governmental authorities confront
the added pressure of the overcrowding of courts and prisons which further encourages them
to seek to resolve the conflict. See Mahatma Gandhi, The Right of Civil Disobedience, in
NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE, supra note 62, at 170, 172.
77. Mahatma Gandhi, Moral Qualifications For Satyagrapha, in NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE, supra note 62, at 51, 54.
78. Id.
79. Mahatma Gandhi, The Right of Civil Disobedience, in NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE,
supra 62, at 174.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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Gandhi profoundly impacted the practice and theory of modern
American civil disobedience. Martin Luther King writes that in the
Gandhian emphasis upon love and nonviolence, he discovered the
method for social reform he had been seeking: "I came to feel that
this was the only morally and practically sound method open to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom."82 Unlike Gandhi, most Americans tend to view civil disobedience as a short-term practical political
tactic rather than as a long-term spiritual discipline and enterprise A8
In the United States, over the course of the last three decades, civil
disobedience primarily has been employed to draw attention to a cause;
to exert pressure on the government by straining the resources of
the already overcrowded and underfunded criminal justice system; to
coerce others into compliance with the disobedients' demands; or to
force the courts to constitutionally review a statute. 4 In addition, in
contrast to Gandhi, many American disobedients have not been willing
to concede their legal guilt. Instead, they have viewed their acts as
consistent with the American revolutionary tradition and as an expression of their fundamental civil and political rights. American courts,
however, like the judges who convicted and punished Gandhi, have
remained adamant in viewing acts of civil disobedience as unjustifiable
criminal protest.
IV. '

AMERICAN COURTS AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN THE

1960s

During the 1960s, the Supreme Court reviewed the conviction of
individuals arrested for acts of civil disobedience directed against racial
segregation. The Court clearly stated that it would neither legally
justify nor morally countenance acts of disobedience, irrespective of
how virtuous the motives of disobedients. 85

82.

MARTIN

LUTHER

KING JR.,

STRIDE

TOWARD

FREEDOM:

THE

MONTGOMERY

STORY 97 (1958).
83. Gandhi's thought reflected Indian religious philosophy and values and was not easily
accepted by most Americans. See generally BONDURANT, supra note 8, at 105-45. Despite
Martin Luther King's adherence to Gandhian philosophy in his writings, it has been argued he
came to appreciate that, in practice, it was necessary to view civil disobedience as a practical
political tactic designed to elicit a violent response in order to attract widespread popular support
for the civil rights movement. See DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 221-36 (1978). The practical application of
civil disobedience is termed Duragrapharather than Satyagrapha. BONDURANT, supra note
8, at 42-44.
84. For a revision of the theory and practice of civil disobedience, see HOWARD ZINN,
DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY: NINE FALLACIES ON LAW AND ORDER (1968).
85. See generally ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1968).
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In Adderley v. Florida,- a group of roughly two-hundred university
students entered the grounds of the jail in Tallahassee, Florida. s7 The
students' intent was to protest the previous day's arrest of their fellow
demonstrators and to express their opposition to state and local segregationist policies, which included the segregation of the jail. 88 The
county sheriff ordered the students to leave and warned that those
who did not would be arrested for trespass8 9 One-hundred and seven
students defied the sheriffs order and were arrested.- The Court
rejected the petitioner's argument that their arrest violated their
rights of free speech and assembly.91 It ruled that the State, like a
private property owner, has the prerogative to prevent individuals
who interfere with the use of its property. 92 The petitioners, according
to the Court, posed a threat to security, blocked vehicular traffic, and
possessed no right to remain on the jail grounds. 9 In conclusion, the
Court observed that individuals do not have the right to demonstrate
"whenever and however and wherever they please . . . .The United
of its
States Constitution does not forbid a State to control the use
94
own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose."
Justice Douglas, in dissent, 95 proclaimed that it is a tragedy when
"a trespass law is used to bludgeon those who ... protest ... against
one of the most grievous of all modern oppressions which some of our
States are inflicting on our citizens. ' 96 He warned that "by allowing
these orderly and civilized protests against injustice to be suppressed,
we only increase the forces of frustration which the conditions of
second-class citizenship are generating amongst us."Justice Douglas' fellow judges shared his sympathy for the aims
and aspirations of the civil rights movement. 9s However, the majority

86. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
87. Id. at 40, 46.
88. Id. at 40.
89. Id. at 46.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 41.
92. Id. at 47.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 48.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 55.
97. Id. at 56.
98. The Court, at times, strained to acquit civil disobedients. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana (I), 379
U.S. 536 (1965); Cox. v. Louisiana (II), 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963).
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continued to admonish activists that they were not "free to ignore all
the procedures of the law and carry their battle into the streets. ' "
No individual "can be judge of his own case, however exalted his
station, however righteous his motives, and irrespective of his race,
color, politics or religion."' °o The Court reminded activists that respect
for legal processes "is a small price to pay for the civilizing hand of
law, which alone can give abiding meaning to constitutional free-

dom.

101

The era of the Vietnam War was characterized by an outpouring
of civil disobedience and resistance to conscription. 10 2 It is estimated
that over 200,000 individuals were accused of violating the selective
service laws, of whom 25,000 were indicted and 10,000 were subjected
to trial. 103 The average prison sentence for draft offenders during
1968-69 was three years - a penalty more severe than the average
sentence meted out to those convicted of similar offenses during World
War II and the Korean War.-°
Legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin, alarmed over the criminal prosecution of such "loyal and law-respecting citizens,"' 1 5 argued that
prosecutors and judges had a "responsibility" to halt the prosecution
and conviction of those arrested for draft-related offenses.106 Dworkin
contended that citizens possessed the prerogative to violate laws such as those which relate to conscription for combat in the Vietnam
War - which contravene their conscience and which they reasonably
believe to be unconstitutional. 107 The only limitation, according to
Dworkin, is that the law violation may not interfere with the moral
rights of others.-'~ He contended that to prosecute individuals for
breaching statutes whose constitutionality was uncertain violated due

99. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 321 (1967).
100. Id. at 321-22.
101. Id. at 321. See also FORTAS, supra note 85 (At the time he wrote this book, Fortas
was an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.).
102. See generally STEVEN E. BARKAN, PROTESTERS ON TRIAL: CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
THE SOUTHERN CIVIL RIGHTS AND VIETNAM ANTIWAR MOVEMENTS 87-148 (1985).
103. LAWRENCE M. BASKIR & WILLIAM A. STRAUSS, CHANCE AND CIRCUMSTANCE:
THE DRAFT, THE WAR AND THE VIETNAM GENERATION 69 (1978) (8,750 defendants were
convicted after trial or following a guilty plea; while 1,305 defendants were acquitted. 4,000
individuals received prison sentences of which 750 were suspended).
104. Id. at 79. The length of sentences lessened as opposition to the war mounted. Id. at
78-79.

105.

Ronald Dworkin, Civil Disobedience, in TAKING

106.
107.
108.

Id. at 222.
Id. at 214-16.
Id. at 218.
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process of law."- In addition, Dworkin pointed out that civil' disobedience was a principle method by which the constitutionality of statutes
could be judicially reviewed.110 Such review helped to insure that statutory laws were consistent with democratic principles and the preservation of individual liberty.- Thus, Dworkin concluded that a legally
tolerant attitude towards those who resisted the draft enhanced, rather
than interfered with, the advancement of the rule of law.112
The government, however, refused to countenance the open defiance of law, and the prosecution of draft resisters continued. In 1969,
the government prosecuted and convicted famed pediatrician, Dr. Benjamin Spock, along with four others for conspiracy to counsel, aid and
abet selective service registrants to refuse service in the armed
forces." 8 In overturning the conviction, Judge Coffin, dissenting in
part in a separate opinion, 114 concluded that to apply the conspiracy
doctrine to these public opponents of the war was "not compelled by
conspiracy precedents, not consistent with First Amendment principles, not required to deal effectively with the hazard to public security,
and not capable of discriminating application as between the culpable
and the innocent."1 5 He warned that such prosecutions would have a
"chilling effect - indeed that of a sub-zero blast - on all kinds of
efforts to sway public opinion" and that the "ranks of individuals
116
enlisted in a controversial cause would visibly shrink.
Some activists argued that the judiciary demonstrated that the
courts were not neutral arbiters of fact and law. Instead, the courts
were partisan institutions which rationalized and legitimized the
policies of the political branches. Judges were portrayed as straining
to interpret the law to convict defendants and, thereby, to stifle dissent, deter protest and discourage criticism of the war. Thus, these
activists concluded that the judiciary was complicite in the perpetuation of the Vietnam War and that civil disobedience should extend

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

113.

See

SLOANE

at
at
at
at

221.
212.
214.
222.

JESSICA

COFFIN,

JR.;

MITFORD,
MICHAEL

THE

TRIAL

FERBER;

OF

DR.

MITCHELL

SPOCK;

THE

GOODMAN;

REV.
AND

WILLIAM
MARCUS

RASKIN (1969).

114.
115.
116.

United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 184 (5th Cir. 1969).
Id.
Id. at 188.
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into the courtroom. Defendants were urged to protest trial court rulings which denied them fair trials.117
New York University law professor Graham Hughes, in his essay
11 s concluded
In Defense of Disobedience,
that the evidence pointed to
a "serious breakdown of law and order."119 He contended that those
victimized by "real inequities and iniquities 12° can "bring not unpersuasive moral arguments for their legitimate exemption from usual duties
of cooperation with the processes of the legal system. ' I 2, The "halls
of justice must themselves be cleansed before those who are dragged
122
inside them may be expected to show any respect.'
The tactic of confronting the judiciary climaxed in the 1969 trial
of the Chicago Seven.- The defendants were indicted for conspiracy
to travel to Chicago with the intent to incite, organize and promote
a riot designed to disrupt the 1968 Democratic National Convention. 124
During the trial, the defendants increasingly became frustrated at
Judge Julius Hoffman's evidentiary rulings which prevented them from
presenting their planned political defense. The defendants aggressively
challenged the judge. Their acts ranged from laughter and defiant
remarks to civil disobedience.1H The judge responded by levying 175
contempt citations against the defendants and instructed the marshals
to bind and gag Black Panther Bobby Seale.126 Defendant David Dellinger explained that since "we were not permitted to present our

117.

See generally

LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS TO DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER

AND THE COURTS (Robert Lefcourt ed., 1971). See William Kunstler, Open Resistance: In

Defense
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

of the Movement, in id. at 267.
Graham Hughes, In Defense of Disruption, 30 THE ANTIOCH REV. 171 (1970).
Id. at 174.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 176.
123. See JASON EPSTEIN, THE GREAT CONSPIRACY TRIAL; AN ESSAY ON LAW,
LIBERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1970).
124. Id. at 85-101. A study commission determined that a significant amount of the disruption
was due to "unrestrained and indiscriminate police violence." National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence, Rights in Conflict: The Violent Confrontation of Demonstrators and
Police in the Parks and Streets of Chicago During the Week of the Democratic National Convention of 1968, a report submitted by Daniel Walker, Director of the Chicago Study Team.
125. See THE TALES OF HOFFMAN (M. L. Levine, G. C. McNamee & D. Greenberg eds.,
1970) (edited from the official transcript).
126. See CONTEMPT TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONTEMPT CITATIONS, SENTENCES AND RESPONSES OF THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY 10 (1970). Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., counts 175
contempt citations. Kalven, Preface, in id. at VII, XVIII. Judge Hoffman's levying of contempt
citations against the defendants was reversed on appeal. See United States v. Dellinger, 461
F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972); see also United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
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case 'legally,' we had to present it 'illegally. ' '127The defendants, according to Dellinger, refused to "sit silently through charges of lies and
'
repressive rituals" 128 and collaborate in their own "destruction."129
The United States Supreme Court quickly provided trial judges
with constitutional mechanisms to control disruptive defendants. In
1970, in Illinois v. Allen, 130 the Court described the judicial branch
as "palladiums of liberty 13 and "citadels of justice132 which must not
be "bullied, insulted and humiliated and their orderly progress
thwarted and obstructed by defendants brought before them charged
with crimes. ' '" The Court suggested three constitutionally permissible
methods for a trial judge to control obstreperous defendants: to bind
and gag them; to cite them for contempt; or to remove them from the
courtroom until they promise to properly conduct themselves.'3
Most defendants, while sympathetic to those who endorsed the
disruption of trials, believed American courts remained capable of
fairly adjudicating legal issues.1 Rather than disrupt the trial, these
defendants argued it was imperative to plead not guilty and seek
formal legal vindication.136 An acquittal would symbolically affirm the
illegality and illegitimacy of the war.1 37 Most defendants also desired
to avoid conviction and incarceration since they believed they could
make a more significant contribution to the anti-war effort outside of
prison. 1- In addition, a trial offered the opportunity to educate the
139
public.
Defendants frequently relied upon a pro se defense.140 They viewed
a pro se defense as a symbolic assertion that they would not be intimi-

David Dellinger, Disorderin the Courtroom, in MORE POWER THAN WE KNOW: THE
219, 233 (1975).
128. David Dellinger, Sometimes the Duty of a Revolutionary Organizer is to Go to Jail,
in id. at 246, 256.
129. Id. at 257.
130. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
131. Id. at 346.
132. Id. at 347.
133. Id. at 346.
134. Id. at 344.
135. See Noam Chomsky, Paul Lauter & Florence Howe, Reflections on a Political Trial,
127.

PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT TOWARD DEMOCRACY

in TRIALS

OF THE RESISTANCE

74, 80-81 (1970).

136.
137.

Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 92.
138. See David Mitchell, What Is Criminal?, in WE WON'T Go: PERSONAL ACCOUNTS OF
WAR OBJECTORS 92, 107-08 (A. Lynd ed., 1968).
139. See Noam Chomsky, On the Limits of Civil Disobedience, in FOR REASONS OF STATE
74, 79-81 (1970).
140. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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dated; and that they would continue to struggle against the government in the courtroom. It permitted the defendants to directly address
and establish a personal relationship with the jury and to impress
them with their sincerity. 141 Judges, who realized the defendants lacked
legal training, usually tolerated their ideological appeals and state2
ments of opinion.1
The defense of jury nullification had particular attraction to defendants, who desired to directly challenge the morality and legality of
the Vietnam War.1 4 3 Jury nullification provides the judge the discretion
to instruct the jury that they have the inherent right to disregard
the law and facts, and to acquit the defendants if they believe a
conviction would be unfair or unjust."1- This instruction enabled defense
attorneys to present a "political case" and largely ignore legal
technicalities. Attorneys argued that the defendants acted in protest
to an unpopular, immoral and illegal war, and the jury, as a matter
4 5
of conscience, should disregard the law and acquit the defendants.'
Defense attorneys attempted to inspire jurors to act in the same
courageous fashion as the jurors who, in 1735, refused to convict
newspaper editor Peter Zenger for seditious libel against the British
colonial governor of New York; or those who refused to convict individuals who violated the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850; or the jurors
who refused to convict those who violated laws enforcing prohibition
14 6
in the early twentieth century.
Jury nullification was successfully invoked in various local trial
courts. 41 7 However, in the Berrigan draft records case, federal Judge
Thomsen refused to issue jury nullification instructions and denied
permission to William Kunstler to urge the jury to disregard the law."14

141. See Cameron Cunningham, The Trial of the Gainesville Eight: The Legal Lessons of
a Political Trial, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 15 (1974).
142. See Robert A. Barker, Evidence: Did Angela Davis Testify?, 37 ALBANY L. REV. 1
(1972). Defendants also used sophisticated social scientific survey techniques in an attempt to
select a sympathetic jury. See Jon Van Dyke, Selecting a Jury in Political Trials, 27 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 609 (1977).
143. See Joseph L. Sax, Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of War Resisters, 57
THE YALE REV. 81 (1968).

144. See Alan Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 48 S. CAL. L. REV.
168-69 (1972).
145. Id. at 199-201.
146. See Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification:The Contours of a Controversy,
43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 71-72 (1980).
147. Scheflin, supra note 144, at 199-201.
148.

See DANIEL BERRIGAN, THE TRIAL OF THE CATONSVILLE NINE 104-05 (1970) (a

dramatic account of the trial which utilizes the original transcript). See generally supra notes
61-62.
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld District Court Judge
Thomsen's rulings.149 Judge Sobeloff recognized the undisputed power
of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the legal instructions issued by the judge.15° However, he ruled that the judge is not
required to inform the jury of their right of jury nullification since
this would result in "negating the rule of law in favor of the rule of
lawlessness.' ' 151 In United States v. Dougherty,152 Judge Leventhal observed that it is unnecessary for the trial judge to inform the jury of
their prerogative to disregard the law since the media and popular
culture already have provided them with this information. 5 Judge
Bazelon, in his dissent, ' noted that Judge Leventhal's contention was
disingenuous.'- He pointed out that, even if jurors were aware of
jury nullification, that judges strongly discouraged jurors from exercising their discretion.- Bazelon chastised his fellow judges for their
decision:
If revulsion against the war in Southeast Asia has reached
a point where a jury would be unwilling to convict a defendant for commission of the acts alleged here, we would be
far better advised to ponder the implications of that result
than to spend our time devising stratagems which let us
pretend that the power of nullification does not even exist. 157
Defendants also attempted to persuade courts to recognize the
good motive defense. They argued that their altruistic motive to protest and halt the Vietnam War exculpated them from criminal liability.
Criminal law concerns itself with punishing morally blameworthy individuals; and the defendants contended that the legal system, therefore,
should distinguish between those who violate the law out of goodness,
from those who violate the law out of greed. It was pointed out that
courts already analyzed defendants' motives to determine the applicability of criminal defenses such as duress and defense of self and

149.
(1970).
150.
151.
denied,
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910
Id. at 1006.
Id.; see also United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 1969), cert.
397 U.S. 997 (1970).
473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1135.
Id. at 1138.
Id. at 1141-44.
Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1144.
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others.- In 1969, in the Oakland Seven Conspiracy159 case, the court
acquitted the defendants of conspiracy to resist the draft and trespass
on the grounds of the Oakland draft induction center.16° Their acquittal,
in large part, was due to the fact that the Superior Court instructed
the jury that they were entitled to give the defendants' motive "the
'
weight to which you find it to be entitled."161
The good motive defense, however, was expressly rejected in 1972
by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Cullen.162
The Court conceded that Cullen's public burning of draft files was
sincerely motivated by a noble and unselfish purpose.'- Nevertheless,
it ruled that the defendant's motive was irrelevant to the determination
of guilt.
In a case such as this, if the proof discloses that the prohibited act was voluntary, and that the defendant actually
knew, or reasonably should have known that it was a public
wrong, the burden to prove the requisite intent has been
met; proof of motive, good or bad, has no relevance to that

issue. i6
The Court observed that recognition of the good motive defense
would lead to anarchy. An "individual might commit bigamy to avoid
eternal damnation; steal from the rich to give alms to the poor; burn
and destroy, not merely public records or perhaps buildings but even
public servants as well, to implement a utopian design."' The Court
of Appeals concluded that the defendant's attempt to elevate his own
conscience over the will of the majority evinced a "form of arrogance
which organized society cannot tolerate."' 1
Defendants also claimed their protests constituted expression protected under the First Amendment. In most instances, however,

158. The case for the good motive defense is set forth in Comment, CriminalResponsibility
and the Political Offender, 24 AM. U. L. REV. 797 (1975). See also Comment, The Excusable
Motive Defense, 6 SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 13 (1977).
159. JOHN F. BANNAN & ROSEMARY S. BANNAN, LAW, MORALITY AND VIETNAM: THE
PEACE MILITANT AND THE COURTS 107-123 (1974).
160. Id. at 117.
161. Id. at 120.
162. 454 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1971).
163. Id. at 389.
164. Id. at 392.
165. Id.
166. Id. Courts also rejected religious motive as a justification for criminal acts. See id. at
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Courts ruled that the defendants' intent to communicate their dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War did not, in and of itself, convert their
nonviolent criminal actions into protected expression. 167 In United
' O'Brien burned his Selective Service
States v. O'Brien,1
registration
certificate on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse, and he was
convicted of knowingly destroying and mutilating his draft certificate. 16 9 He stated at his trial that he had burned his card to express
his dissatisfaction with the war and mobilize support for the anti-war
effort. 170
The Supreme Court rejected O'Brien's contention that the burning
of his registration certificate constituted symbolic speech. In reviewing
O'Brien's claim, the Court ruled that where speech and non-speech
elements are intertwined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest can justify incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms. 17 , The Court determined that the government had just such a substantial interest in preventing the mutilation
and destruction of registration certificates. Such certificates, according
to the Court, provided proof of registration; furnished a convenient
record of th6 registrant's Selective Service number and classification;
and informed registrants' of the address of their local board and of
72
the procedures to be followed in the event of a change of address.1
The law prohibiting destruction of Selective Service certificates thus,
in the words of the Court, "no more abridges free speech on its face
than a motor vehicle law prohibiting the destruction of drivers'
licenses, or a tax law prohibiting the destruction of books and records."173
The judiciary thus was hesitant to clothe nonviolent criminal acts
with First Amendment protection and risk opening the floodgates of
protest. In United States v. Miller,17 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals warned that if the burning of draft cards and registration
certificates were elevated to the status of protected expression that
resisters would be encouraged to claim similar protection for acts
involving even greater social disruption. 175 What is next, queried the

167.
But see
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1973).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 378-79.
Id. at 375.
367 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967).
Id. at 79.
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Court, "turning on water faucets, dumping of garbage in front of City
Hall, stalling cars at an event attracting heavy traffic, burning an
American flag on a street corner, or tearing up on television a court
order or a document required to be kept under internal revenue reg76
ulations?"
Defendants also unsuccessfully relied upon several traditional legal
defenses which were predicated upon the illegality of the Vietnam
War. In several cases, defendants relied upon the mistake of law
defense. 177 They argued that they (mistakenly) believed their acts were
justified in light of the illegality of the Vietnam War. Courts, however,
ruled that the mistake of law defense was only available to defendants
who genuinely misunderstood the requirements of the law. In contrast,
the courts observed that these defendants knowingly and intentionally
violated the letter of the law. In United States v. Boardman,178
Boardman was a conscientious objector who declined to report for
alternative service and was convicted for refusing civilian work. He
claimed that he believed his refusal was justified in light of the illegality
of the government's conduct in Vietnam. 19 The First Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that there was no "misunderstanding of what the law
required, and the power of Congress to impose such requirements has
long been settled. '' 180 Thus, the defendant "disobeyed a well-settled
requirement in order to protest the entire conscription system, and
hopefully to make new law, but that does not give him immunity from
the sanctions of the old law if he is unsuccessful in his efforts." ' s
Those who invoked the justification defense were equally as unsuccessful.1*2 The justification defense exculpates individuals from liability
for acts taken in self-defense; in defense of others or of property; or
undertaken to avert a public disaster or crime.13 In United States v.
Simpson,184 Simpson illegally gained access to the local Selective Service Board's file room, and incinerated draft records.1s5 He argued
that his actions were a justifiable effort to avert the United States'
criminal acts in Vietnam. The trial court ruled that the justification

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
See Leiss v. United States, 364 A.2d 805 (D.C. 1976).
419 F.2d at 110.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 115.
Id.
See United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972).
United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 517 (9th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 515.
Id. at 516.
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defense was inapplicable as a matter of law and refused to permit the
defense to introduce the proffered evidence or to issue the instructions
T M The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
which the defense requested.'
affirmed the trial court's rulings. It explained that the justification
defense is based on the proposition that society benefits when an
individual acts to prevent another from intentionally or negligently
causing injury to others or to property. 18 7 In this case, the Court ruled
that Simpson's "reckless, dangerous acts" were not reasonably related
T M It was "unto the eradication of the harms he sought to prevent.'
reasonable for Simpson to assume that any violent action he initiated
might have any significant effect upon the supposed ills he hoped to

remedy. "189
Thus, courts refused to permit defendants to attempt to legally
justify their criminal acts of protest. Such criminal acts were viewed
by the courts as common crimes; and jurors were not exposed to
evidence which related to the morality or legality of the war. The
judiciary admonished defendants that those who deliberately violated
the law, whatever their motivation, must accept their legal guilt.
Otherwise, respect for the law would be diminished and anarchy would
Occasionally, defendants were successful in attacking the conresult. 190
stitutionality of the statutes under which they were indicted. However,
such due process claims did not involve the introduction of evidence
which related to the Vietnam War.' 9'

V.

ANTI-WAR PROTEST AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

A.

The Political Question Doctrine

Unsuccessful in their efforts to gain legal vindication under domestic law principles, activists began to invoke arguments based upon
international law.- A number of lawsuits in part, were premised on
the contention that the Vietnam War was unconstitutional and violative
of various multilateral agreements. 193 In virtually every instance, fed186. Id. at 517.
187. Id. at 517-18.
188. Id. at 518.
189. Id.
190. 472 F.2d at 857-58.
191. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1973).
192. See Quincy Wright, Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 750
(1966).
193. See Robert P. Sugarman, Judicial Decisions Concerning the Constitutionality of
United States Military Activity in Indo China: A Bibliography of Court Decisions, 13 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 470 (1974), cited in Louis Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?,
85 YALE L.J. 597, 623 n.74 (1976).
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eral courts invoked the standing and political question doctrines and
refused to rule on the legality of the Vietnam War.194 In Mora v.
McNamara,95 the Supreme Court refused to hear an action by draftees
who sought to obtain an injunction to prevent their being sent to
serve in what they alleged to be an illegal war in Vietnam.1 96 Justice
Stewart, in his dissent,'19 warned that the Court "cannot make the
problems [of the Vietnam War] go away simply by refusing to hear
the case of three obscure army pilots."'198
In United States v. Valentine,199 the defendants attempted to justify
their refusal to submit to induction into the armed forces on the
grounds that the Vietnam War was contrary to international law and
to various treaty obligations of the United States government. 2 °0 The
District Court ruled that the defendants lacked standing to challenge
the legality of the war.201 The Court reasoned that the defendants
were charged with refusing induction, not with refusing to obey an
order which assigned them to Vietnam and that it was entirely a
"matter of conjecture whether their induction ever would have led
them to their receiving such an order. ' '2 02 In addition, judicial examination into the "conduct of foreign policy or the use and disposition of
military forces by the executive branch would violate the doctrine of
separation of powers which is at the heart of our constitutional system
of government." 2 0 In Luftig v. McNamara,2 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia refused to hear a suit brought
20 5
by an Army private who sought to enjoin his being sent to Vietnam.
The Court, in a per curiam decision, emphasized that the legality of
the Vietnam War is a political question and that "resort to the courts
is futile, in addition to being wasteful of judicial time, for which there
are urgent legitimate demands. ''2 0 The Court observed that:

194. Id.
195. 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 935; see also Mitchell v. United States, 386 U.S. 972 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
199. 288 F. Supp. 957 (D.P.R. 1968).
200. Id. at 984.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
205. Id. at 665.
206. Id.
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It is difficult to think of an area less suited for judicial action
than that into which Appellant would have us intrude. The
fundamental division of authority and power established by
the Constitution precludes judges from overseeing the conduct of foreign policy or the use and disposition of military
power; these matters are plainly the exclusive province of
Congress and the Executive.27
Judge Wyzanski, in United States v. Sisson,20 8 noted that the invocation of the political question doctrine, in addition to being based
upon the separation of powers, was a recognition that domestic tribunals were incapable of "eliciting the facts during a war"20 9 and were
"probably incapable of exercising a disinterested judgement which
would command the confidence of sound judicial opinion. ' 210 He conceded that American courts were "entirely unfit to adjudicate the
question whether there has been a violation of international law during
a war by the very nation which created, manned, and compensated
211
the tribunal seized of the case."
Professor Graham Hughes, in 1968, observed that the judiciary's
reliance upon the political question doctrine left disobedients in a
"limbo of legality '212 in which courts were perceived as having abdicated their constitutional duty to determine the legality of the Vietnam
War. 213 Courts' invocation of the political question doctrine merely
fueled the debate over the Vietnam conflict214 and encouraged individuals to reach their own conscientious decisions as to the constitutionality of the war. 2 5 Hughes implied that given the judicial failure to
rule on the legality of the war, it was unfair to hold civil disobedients
legally liable. 216 He proposed that individuals who engaged in nonvio-

207. Id. at 665-66.
208. 294 F. Supp. 515 (D. Mass. 1968). See United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 520 (D.
Mass. 1968), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1970).
209. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. at 517.
210. Id. at 517-18.
211. Id. at 517.
212. Graham Hughes, Civil Disobedience and the Political Question Doctrine, 43 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 18 (1968).
213. Id. at 17-18.
214. Id. at 18-19.
215. Id. at 17. Hughes argued that the effect of the judiciary's reliance upon the political
question doctrine was to settle the legality, but not the constitutionality of the Vietnam War.

Id. at 18.
216.

Id. 5-6.
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lent acts of civil disobedience to challenge the constitutionality of the
war should be permitted to rely upon a modified mistake of law de-

fense.217
B.

The Nuremberg Defense

Those who refused induction or service in Vietnam, as illustrated
by Valentine and Luflig, premised their opposition on the unconstitutional and illegal nature of the Vietnam War. 218 As the war persisted,
opposition increasingly focused on the alleged war crimes perpetrated
by the United States government. 219 Resisters began to attempt to
justify their acts of civil disobedience on the Nuremberg Principles.- °
The Nuremberg Tribunal convicted twenty-two high-level German
governmental officials of Crimes against Peace (waging an aggressive
war), War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. 21 The Tribunal did
not extend international criminal liability to low-level officials and
combatants or to civilians.- The Nuremberg Judgment, however,
stressed that individuals have international duties which transcend
the national obligations imposed by domestic governments.- Those
who violate such international duties, whether private citizens or governmental officials, are subject to prosecution and punishment under
international law. m
Anti-war activists viewed these legal principles as creating a moral
imperative for individuals to act to halt the international lawlessness
of governments.- In 1971, Richard Falk observed that the Nuremberg
217. Id. Hughes proposes the mistake of law defense, but is rather guarded and vague as
to how it would apply to the case of those who violate the law in order to challenge the legality
of the Vietnam War. See also Comment, Civil Disobedience: A Case for Separate Treatment,
14 WAYNE L. REV. 1165 (1968).
218. See supra notes 199-207 and accompanying texts.
219. See TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY
(1970); see also Matthew Lippman, The My Lai Massacre and the InternationalLaw of War,

in

TERRIBLE BEYOND ENDURANCE? THE FOREIGN POLICY OF STATE TERRORISM

313 (M.

Stohl & G.A. Lopez eds., 1988).
220. See Frank Lawrence, The Nuremberg Principles: A Defense for Political Protesters,

40

HASTINGS

L.J. 97 (1989).

221. XXII Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal
(1947) [hereinafter Trial of the Major War Criminals].
222. The Nuremberg Judgement is discussed and criticized in Matthew Lippman, Nuremberg, 6 LAW IN CONTEXT 20 (1988).
223. Trial of the Major War Criminals, supra note 221, at 466.
224. Id.
225. See Francisa A. Boyle, The Relevance of InternationalLaw to the "Paradox"of Nuclear
Deterrence, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1407, 1431 (1986). The Nuremberg defense was raised by a
taxpayer opposed to the Korean War. See Farmer v. Roundtree, 149 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Tenn.
1956), affd per curiam, 252 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1958).
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Principles dictate that any individual who reasonably believes that the
Vietnam War is being waged in violation of law and morality has "an
obligation of conscience to resist participation in and support of that
war effort by every means at [their] disposal . . . . The imperatives
of personal responsibility call upon each of us to search for effective
'' 6
means to bring the war to an immediate end. 2
In United States v. Berrigan,m District Court Judge Northrop
ruled that the defendants lacked standing to raise the so-called Nuremberg defense to justify their pouring of blood on draft files at a Baltimore Selective Service office.- The Court explained that it is not
"clear what standing these defendants have to raise the legality of
this country's involvement in Vietnam when they have not been called
to serve in the armed forces, are not directly affected by our government's actions in that country, and are not even directly affected by
the Selective Service apparatus."2 The Court also determined that
its consideration of the defendants' Nuremberg defense was barred
by the political question doctrine. Judge Northrop ruled that whether
the deployment of the armed forces abroad is in accord with international law is "a question which necessarily must be left to the elected
representatives of the people and not to the judiciary. This is so even
if the government's action are contrary to valid treaties to which the
government is a signatory. ' ' o In a related case, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals reiterated the traditional view that "while in restricted circumstances a morally motivated act contrary to law may
be ethically justified, the action must be non-violent and the actor
must accept the penalty for his action. '"
In 1973, in State v. Marley,2 2 the Supreme Court of Hawaii also
relied upon the standing and political question doctrines to avoid ruling
upon the defendants' Nuremberg defense. The defendants, including

226.

Richard Falk, The Circle of Responsibility, in

DOCUMENTARY,

CRIMES OF WAR: A LEGAL POLITICAL-

AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF LEADERS,

230 (Richard A. Falk, Gabriel
Kolko & Robert Jay Lifton eds., 1971) [hereinafter CRIMES OF WAR]. See also Richard Falk,
The Nuremberg Defense in the Pentagon PapersCase, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNArL L. 208 (1974).
227. 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968), affd sub nom. United States v. Eberhardt, 417 F.
1009 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970).
228. See Recent Developments, Civil Disobedience-ProtestsBeyond the Law, 14 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 719, 722-23 (1970).
229. 283 F. Supp. at 341.
230. Id. at 342.
231. United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1008 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
910 (1970).
232. 509 P.2d 1095 (1973).
CITIZENS, AND SOLDIERS FOR CRIMINAL ACTS IN WARS 222,
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an A.W.O.L sailor, occupied the corporate offices of the Honeywell
Corporation in an attempt to halt the corporation's manufacture of
anti-personnel weapons which were used by the United States in Vietnam.- The defendants argued that the deployment of these weapons
was contrary to the law of war.The Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected the defendants' contention
that their trespass was justified to avoid criminal liability under the
Nuremberg Principles. 235 The Supreme Court determined that the defendants lacked standing to raise the Nuremberg defense since the
Nuremberg Tribunal did not extend liability beyond those high-level
officials who formulated and executed government policies. 236 The
Court concluded that even assuming arguendo that "Honeywell is a
war criminal, the applicable law does not give these defendants either
a right or a duty to be present without invitation on the Honeywell
premises. ' '2- 7 The Supreme Court of Hawaii also ruled it is "improper
for the judiciary to decide 'political questions' of the sort presented
by reliance on a theory that one's own government violates its own
treaty obligations. ' 238
In sum, resisters were unsuccessful in justifying their acts of disobedience under domestic law. They began to appeal to international
law and the Nuremberg Principles. Courts, however, invoked the
standing and political question doctrines to avoid ruling on international law claims. The judiciary justified its refusal to entertain such
arguments on the separation of powers. Courts ,also appear to have
been conscious of the need to avoid becoming embroiled in the political
controversy and constitutional debate which surrounded the Vietnam
War.
Despite the judiciary's rejection of the Nuremberg defense, the
fact remained that the Constitution recognized treaties as the "supreme law of the land;" 9 and the United States Supreme Court had
continually declared that international law was part of American law
and should be applied whenever applicable240 Richard Falk argued
that the judiciary's refusal to rule on international law claims had

233. Id. at 1099.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1109-10.
236. Id. at 1111 n.17.
237. Id. at 1110.
238. Id.
239. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
240. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also United States v. Smith,
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820); Lopes v. Schroeder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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placed those opposed to the Vietnam War in the "hopeless situation"
of being subject to two irreconcilable obligations.-, On the one hand,
the Nuremberg Principles proscribed complicity in war crimes and,
on the other hand, domestic law required adherence to the dictates
of national authority. 2 Falk quoted Mr. Justice Roberts to the effect
that prosecution of individuals under such circumstances was violative
of due process of law.2 3 Mr. Justice Roberts observed that if a "citizen
was constrained by two laws, or two orders having the force of law,
and obedience to one would violate the other, to punish him for violation of either would deny him due process of law. And I had supposed
that under these circumstances a conviction for violating one of the
orders could not stand."- Falk concluded that those who opposed the
war based upon international law, at a minimum, deserved to present
their defense.- 5 He contended that to "deny judicial redress in such
circumstances is to shatter any belief in the capacity of our legal
' 6
system to secure justice."
There developed two distinct legal world-views: the practical law
of the moment, applied by courts as a matter of expedience and practicality; and the romantic law of principle which embodied the aspirational values of constitutionalism and international law.- 7 Still, it was
considered important to continue to raise international law defenses
as part of the effort to introduce international norms in domestic law.
Historian Staughton Lynd, in 1967, confidently predicted in a little
noticed essay that:
Ultimately, as the law of nations comes to be written into
national statutory law, civil disobedience on behalf of natural
rights will decrease. Mankind will recognize that in a nuclear
241.

Richard Falk, The Question of War Crimes: A Statement of Perspective, in

CRIMES

OF WAR, supra note 226, at 3, 7.

242. See id.
243. See id. at 7-8.
244. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 232 (1944) (Reynolds, J., dissenting).
245. Falk, The Question of War Crimes: A Statement of Perspective, in CRIMES OF WAR,
supra note 226, at 8.
246. Id.
247. See Noam Chomsky, Paul Lauter & Florence Howe, Reflections on a Political Trial,

in

TRIALS OF THE RESISTANCE

74, 96 (1970). The appeal of international law arguments,

ironically, was accentuated by the failure of courts to consider these claims. International law
defenses and analyses were developed and refined without being tarnished by judicial modification
or rejection. To some, the judiciary's silence testified to its persuasive power. International law
also comported with the political analyses which animated the anti-war movement. The United
States was viewed as an ethnocentric, aggressive superpower which was insensitive to the views
and concerns of developing nations. The fact that America's conduct in Vietnam was contrary
to international law symbolized the gap between America and the rest of the world. Id.
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age nation-states are chronic criminals far more dangerous
than the solitary practitioner of nonviolent civil disobedience.
In the meantime, by saying "No," that disobeyer will seek
to recall authority to common sense.m
VI. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN THE 1970s AND 1980s:
THE JUDICIARY AND THE ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS MOVEMENT
A.

The Development of the Anti-Nuclear Movement

The late 1970s and the decade of the 1980s witnessed a resurgence
in civil disobedience. These acts of protest focused on issues ranging
from abortion 2A9 to homelessness,- nuclear power plants-, and United
2
States involvement in Central America.
One of the most visible campaigns of civil disobedience was undertaken by the so-called Sanctuary Movement. 25 By 1985, over 180
churches and synagogues in eleven cities had declared themselves as
sanctuaries which pledged to shelter refugees fleeing war-torn Central
America.-s It was alleged that the United States government systematically distorted international legal standards and manipulated
the domestic administrative process to deport these refugees back to
their country of origin. 2 Once having been involuntarily returned,
the refugees faced death, torture and imprisonment.- This immigration policy in regards to Central American refugees was alleged to be
in violation of international standards, including the principle of non-refoulment which prohibits the deportation of refugees to a country in

248.

Staughton Lynd, Civil Disobedience in Wartime, 19 ME. L. REV. 49, 54 (1967).

249. See Comment, Necessity as a Defense to a Charge of CriminalTrespass in an Abortion
Clinic, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 501 (1979); Comment, The Necessity Defense in Abortion Clinic
Trespass Cases, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 523 (1987). For a discussion of civil disobedience by
those favoring abortion, see Lynn M. Paltrow, Women, Abortion and Civil Disobedience, 13
NOVA L. REV. 471 (1989).
250. See Griffin v. United States, 447 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982).
251. See Comment, Antinuclear Demonstrations and the Necessity Defense, State v. Warshow, 5 VT. L. REV. 104 (1980); Comment, Necessity: The Right to Present a Recognized
Defense, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 779 (1985-86).
252. See State v. Drummy, 557 A.2d 574 (Conn. 1989).
253. See RENNY GOLDEN & MICHAEL MCCONNELL, SANCTUARY: THE NEW UNDERGROUND RAILROAD (1986).

254.

Douglas Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without Jury a Government's Weapon

Against the Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 6, 47 (1986).
255. Id. at 33-38.
256. GARY MAcEOIN & NIVITA RILEY, No PROMISED LAND: AMERICAN
POLICIES AND THE RULE OF LAW 42-6 (1982).
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which they face a well-founded fear of persecution. 5 7 The Sanctuary
Movement compared itself to those in Nazi Germany who passively
witnessed the slaughter of the Jews. Unlike the German churches,
however, they vowed to assist those in need.In 1985, in United States v. Elder, 9 Jack Elder was convicted of
unlawfully transporting three undocumented Salvadoran aliens. 2 - The
Court, although it recognized that Elder's activities were motivated
by his Christian faith, concluded that his "do-it yourself immigration
policy, gives away what is not his to give away - the Government's
legitimate right to examine every person who enters the country so
that the Government can make informed decisions on who will be
admitted. ' 26 1 Thus, Elder, despite his religious motivation, may not
override the government's exclusive authority and responsibility to
control immigration policies and procedures.262 The Court also dismissed Elder's claim that the Salvadorans, although illegally in the United
States, were entitled to refugee status under international law, and
thus, Elder was justified in offering them assistance.26 The Court
invoked the political question doctrine and ruled that it would not
"interfere with political decisions which the United States as a
sovereign nation chooses to make in the interpretation, enforcement,
2'
or rejection of treaty commitments which affect immigration. r4
Anti-nuclear activists were motivated by the same religious impulse
which animated those in the Sanctuary Movement. In 1982, eight
peace activists entered General Electric's defense plant in King of
Prussia, Pennsylvania "to perform a nonviolent enactment of beating
swords into plowshares. ' ' 2- They hammered and dented the nose-cones
of two re-entry components for Minuteman III ballistic missile systems

257.

IGNATIUS BAU, THIS GROUP IS HOLY: CHURCH SANCTUARY AND CENTRAL AMER-

48-74 (1985).
See Robert McAfee Brown, Biblical Concepts of Idolatry, in SANCTUARY: A RE-

ICAN REFUGEES

258.

SOURCE GUIDE FOR UNDERSTANDING

AND PARTICIPATING IN THE CENTRAL AMERICAN

REFUGEES' STRUGGLE 55, 61 (G. MacEoin ed., 1985). For an overview of the sanctuary movement, see Charles Stastny, Sanctuary and the State, 11 CONTEMPORARY CRISIS 279 (1987).

259. 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
260. Id. at 1576.
261. Id. at 1578.
262. Id. at 1579.
263. Id. at 1581.
264. Id. at 1581. See also United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Merkt (II), 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Merkt (I), 764 F.2d 266
(5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 772 F.2d 904 (1985).
265. See POWER OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 7, at 7.
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and poured blood over drafting plans and equipment before being
arrested.26 The protesters' statement explained that in
confronting GE, we choose to obey God's law of life, rather
than a corporate summons to death . . . . In our action, we
draw on a deep-rooted faith in Christ, who changed the
course of history through his willingness to suffer rather
than to kill. We are filled with hope for our
world and for
267
our children as we join this act of protest.
The action of the "Plowshares Eight" inspired numerous other
Plowshares actions.26 In 1982, approximately 4,000 individuals are
estimated to have been arrested for civil disobedience against nuclear
weapons and facilities.269 In 1984, in one of the first protests directed
against an active nuclear missile, four Plowshares activists, including
two Catholic priests, entered a nuclear silo in Missouri. The silo's
120-ton steel and concrete cover concealed a fifty-seven foot Minuteman III missile whose warhead was one-hundred times more powerful
than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The four activists attempted
to symbolically disarm the missile with a jackhammer, sledgehammer
and other instruments.20
The protesters called their action "Silo Pruning Hooks" to remind
others of the biblical injunction to "beat swords into plowshares and
spears into pruning hooks. '27' They splattered blood on the silo and
hung a banner on the fence which carried the Old Testament quotation:
"Why do you do this evil thing? Our brother's blood cries out to me
from the earth."' 2 They were arrested while they conducted a communion service.273 In the statement placed on the silo, the activists
274
stated that Christians must act as peacemakers.

266.
267.

Id. See Majority of 8, THE NATION, May 7, 1990, at 621.
Daniel Berrigan, Swords into Plowshares, in SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION FOR DISARMAMENT 54, 65 (Arthur J. Laffin & Anne Montgomery eds.,
1987).
268. See Arthur J. Laffin, A Chronology of the Plowshares Disarmament Actions: September 1980-September 1986, id. at 32.
269. Samuel H. Day, Jr., The New Resistance, THE PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 1983, at 22-23.
270. NUCLEAR HEARTLAND: A GUIDE TO THE 1,000 MISSILE SILOS OF THE UNITED
STATES 22 (Samuel H. Day ed., 1988).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. The Silo Pruning Hooks, Silo Pruning Hooks Action Statement, in supra note 267,
at 150.
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Faithful to that mandate, we have come today to begin
the disarmament of one missile silo. In cutting the fence,
we remove the barriers to peace symbolized there. In pouring the blood, we expose the murderous intent inherent in
the weapon and in our government's war policies. In hammering the silo cover and instruments, we render temporarily useless a weapon of mass murder, and in damaging the
warning system, we express our intent to place our trust in
the Lord of275Life rather than in "gods of metal" (Leviticus
19:4, TEV).
As the "Silo Pruning Hooks" trial opened, Martin Holladay was
arrested after scaling the fence surrounding another missile silo. Holladay splattered the silo lid with blood and spray-painted signs that
read: "No More Hiroshimas" and "Disarm Or Dig Graves."' - 6 Between
1980 and 1987, seventy persons participated in eighteen Plowshares
to prison
actions. Thirty-seven of these individuals were sentenced
277
years.
eighteen
to
one
between
from
ranging
terms
Another major group of nuclear activists is the "Missouri Peace
Planting. ''1 s The peace planters reclaimed the rich agricultural land
of Missouri for peaceful purposes and claimed that missile silos were
"scattered in farmers' fields like razors in a loaf of bread. '279 They
proclaimed that: "We can no longer stand silent or inactive while the
government of the United States pursues policies inimical to the wellbeing of earth's inhabitants. We declare our independence from these
policies and commit ourselves to resist them, as we are able, in an
ongoing and non-violent manner."0
In the Pacific Northwest, activists affiliated with the Ground Zero
Center for Nonviolent Action attempted a sea blockade to prevent
the first Trident submarine, the Ohio, from entering Bangor submarine
base.- 1 The Ground Zero group then began to block the path of "White
Trains" which delivered warheads to Bangor.2 2 Other major civil dis-

275. Id. at 151.
276. Richard Pollak, Crime & Punishment, MOTHER JONES, May 1987, at 21, 23. See also
Shirley Swede, Who Is Jean Gump?, Z MAGAZINE, Oct. 1989, at 95.
277. Richard Pollak, Witnessing For Peace, THE NATION, May 2, 1987, at 567.
278. See SAMUEL H. DAY, JR., CROSSING THE LINE FROM EDITOR TO ACTIVIST TO
A WRITER'S JOURNEY 197-205 (1991).
INMATE 279. Missouri Peace Planters, Reclaiming The Land (1987) (available in the author's files).
280. Missouri Peace Planters, We Declare Our Independence (1987) (available in the author's
files).
281. POWER OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 7, at 229.
282. Id. at 231-32.
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obedience campaigns were directed against the Rocky Flats nuclear
weapons plant outside Denver, Colorado;- the University of California's Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos laboratories;8 nuclear
weapons testing, development and storage sites;2 and the United
Nations missions of the five major nuclear powers, where approximately 1,665 people were arrested in a mass action in June 1982.86
These actions were implicitly endorsed by various religious bodies
and denominations which condemned nuclear weapons. 7 Archbishop
Raymond Hunthausen, Bishop of Seattle, called upon people to refuse
to pay fifty percent of their taxes in an act of nonviolent resistance
to "nuclear murder and suicide. '" He stated that he preferred to
view what he advocated as "obedience to God" rather than civil disobedience to secular authority. 9 It is not "the way of the cross which
is in question in the nuclear age," he stated, "but our willingness to
follow it. '"- Shortly thereafter, Bishop Leroy T. Matthiesen, Bishop
of Amarillo, Texas, called upon workers 'at the near-by Pantex plant
to consider quitting their jobs manufacturing nuclear weapons. 8 1 He
urged individuals involved in the production and stockpiling of nuclear
bombs to "consider what they are doing, to resign from such activities
and to seek employment in peaceful pursuits. '"- In 1983, the American
Catholic Bishops expressed "profound skepticism" about the "moral
acceptability of any use of nuclear weapons;"2 3 and extended support
for those committed to Christian nonviolence and pacifism.2 As part
of this anti-nuclear movement, numerous local communities adopted
2 5
ordinances which declared their communities nuclear-free zones. 9

Id. at 230.
Id. at 230, 237.
Id. at 237-38.
Id. at 236.
See NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: KEY STATEMENTS OF POPES, BISHOPS, COUNCILS
AND CHURCHES (Robert Heyer ed., 1982) [hereinafter KEY STATEMENTS].
288. Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen, Address at the Pacific Northwest Synod of the
Lutheran Church in America (July 12, 1981), id. at 131, 136.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Bishop Leroy T. Matthiesen, Nuclear Arms Buildup (Aug. 21, 1981), id. at 155-56.
292. See id.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

293.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS,

PastoralLetter on War and Peace

- The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, reprinted in JIM CASTELLI, THE
BISHOPS AND THE BOMB 185, 243 (1983).
294. Id. at 224.
295. See William N. Weaver, Fay Clayton, Brian D. Roche, Karl Krause, Marguerite M.
Lloyd & Thomas J. Bumonte, The Legality of the Chicago Nuclear Weapon FreeZone Ordinance,
17 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 553 (1986).
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In September 1987, the government sent a clear message to activists that it would not accommodate or tolerate campaigns of civil
disobedience which interfered with military operations. In June 1987,
peace groups announced a series of "Nuremberg Actions" designed to
call attention to and to halt the United States' violation of international
law in Central America. In one of the first "Nuremberg Actions,"
demonstrators blocked the path of a train carrying arms bound for
Central America. The train failed to stop or slow down and ran over
Brian Willson, a Vietnam veteran and prominent activist.- Willson
lost both legs in the accident. The United Deputy District Attorney
of Contra Costa County blamed the demonstrators for the mishap.2
Undaunted, Willson issued a public statement from his hospital bed
following the accident:
I'd like people to take responsibility to stop all the killing
that is being done in our name. Each person's heart will tell
them what is the best form in which to do that. Only we
the people can stop the madness. Hopefully we can get
enough people to stop the arms shipments . . . and then it
will spread to the rest of the country. Hopefully no one else
will have to lose their legs - but maybe they will. 8
B.

The Anti-Nuclear Movement and the Courts

Anti-nuclear activists generally attempted to justify their protests
on the basis of international law and the Nuremberg Principles. Activists, with their religiously-based morality, were attracted to international law's transcendent universalism and utopian visionary character. Courts, however, as in the 1960s, rejected international law arguments.
Defendants argued that, under the Nuremberg Principles, they
had the privilege, if the not the duty, to violate domestic law to protest
or halt violations of international law. Federal courts ruled that the
Nuremberg Principles only imposed criminal liability on those engaged
in acts violative of international law. Such individuals had the duty
to refuse to commit such acts and, if necessary, were privileged to
violate domestic law. In contrast, anti-nuclear activists were not required, under domestic law, to commit acts violative of the Nuremberg

296.
297.
col. 1.
298.

See James Ridgeway, Blood on the Tracks, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 15, 1987, at 36.
Train Crew Is Cleared in Injury of a Protester, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1987, at 10,
Attempted Murder, GUARDIAN, Sept. 16, 1987, at 1, 9, col. 2.
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Principles. They did not face international criminal liability and, thus,
could claim no privilege or duty to violate domestic law.- 99
The judiciary ruled that defendants "stand [the Nuremberg Principles] on [their] head in arguing that a person charged with no duty
or responsibility by domestic law may voluntarily violate a criminal
law and claim that violation was required to avoid liability under
international law. '"" It would be "a great extension of [Nuremberg]
to hold that persons who remain passive, neither aiding nor opposing
their governments' international violations, were war criminals merely
by virtue of their citizenship or residence in their given countries."'31
If failure "to object does not make one complicate, persons such as
the defendants here are in no danger of sanction under international
law and can claim no privilege to violate domestic law to protect
themselves. '"- Courts concluded that to recognize the privilege of
citizens to violate domestic law to uphold international law would
"foment an anarchical result. '" 3°
The judiciary pointed out that only those individuals who are able
to demonstrate a direct harm to themselves possess standing to bring
a civil action against a governmental policy or program.3 The courts
accused the defendants of attempting to manipulate the judicial system
by deliberately flouting the law to litigate the international legality
of unrelated governmental programs. 30 5 Judges rejected this effort to
transform the laws which penalize trespass, damage to property and
disorderly conduct into political offenses;3 and refused to be placed
in the untenable position of reviewing the political branches exercise
37
of their constitutionally exclusive powers. 0
A significant development in 1987 was a litigation manual authored
by Professor Francis Boyle of the University of Illinois on behalf of
the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy." Boyle argued that
lawyers should abandon their reliance on "separate and independent"

299. See United States v. Kabat, 797 F.2d 580, 590 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Montgomery, 772 F.2d 733 (11th Cir. 1985).
300. 772 F.2d at 738.
301. 797 F.2d at 590.
302. Id.
303. People v. Weber, 208 Cal. Rptr. 719, 722 (1984).
304. United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1980).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1010.
307. Id. at 1009.
308. FRANCIS A. BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESISTANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1987).
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international law defenses . 3 °- Instead, Boyle urged lawyers to integrate
international law defenses into traditional common law and statutory
defenses. 310 Boyle suggested that to defend those who engaged in acts

of nonviolent resistance against United States nuclear weapons
policies and international law, it is relevant to establish 1) defenses
of compulsion, necessity, choice of evils, prevention of a crime or
public catastrophe, 2) measures otherwise authorized by law, and 3)
defense of self and others.311

Boyle termed this amalgam of domestic and international law "civil
resistance. '' 312 He argued that civil resisters engaged in justified acts
designed to halt ongoing international illegality by the government.
Thus, Boyle brilliantly pointed out that when viewed through the
prism of international law, it was the civil resister who acted to uphold
the rule of law, and it was the government which engaged in criminal
behavior. He admonished lawyers that they "must never refer to your
case as one of civil disobedience since such a characterization assumes
''
the guilt of your clients. 313

A major contribution to the integration of international and domestic law was made by Aldridge and Stark, who, in a seminal article,
suggested international law arguments could be combined with the
domestic necessity defense to defend civil resistance against nuclear
weapons. 314 The necessity defense justified a violation of law to avoid

a greater harm. As developed by contemporary American courts, there
are four requirements for the defense of necessity:
(1) the defendant is faced with a clear and imminent danger,
not one which is debatable or speculative; (2) the defendant
can reasonably expect that his action will be effective as the
direct cause of abating the danger; (3) there is no legal alternative which will be effective in abating the danger; and (4)

309. Id. at 23.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 24.
312. Id. at 5, 17.
313. Id. at 17. Boyle emphasized that civil resisters were distinct from civil disobedients.
The former were engaged in justified actions, while the latter admitted their guilt and primarily
were concerned with appealing to conscience and to public opinion. Id.
314. Robert Aldridge & Virginia Stark, Nuclear War, Citizen Intervention, and the Necessity Defense, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299 (1986). For an exposition on how the Nuremberg
Principles might be integrated into the common law claim of defense of others, see Arthur W.
Campbell, The Nuremberg Defense to Charges of Domestic Crime: A Non-TraditionalApproach
for Nuclear-Arms Protestors, 16 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 3 (1986).
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the Legislature has not acted to preclude the defense by a
clear and deliberate choice regarding the value at issue. 15
The necessity or choice of evils defense rests upon the utilitarian
ground that the law should not punish those who act to avoid a greater
harm than is occasioned by their violation of the law. The application
of criminal law in such situations is thought to serve no deterrent
function, and punishment of those who acted out of "necessity" would
316
reduce respect for the law.
Defendants increasingly began to rely on the necessity defense to
justify their protests against nuclear weapons. They typically argued
that: (1) it was reasonable to believe the use of such weapons was
illegal under international law, and their deployment would cause
global destruction; (2) the harm created by the defendants' actions
was of lesser consequence than that which would result from the use
of nuclear weapons; (3) the United States deployed nuclear weapons
against the Japanese and approached the brink of initiating a nuclear
attack on numerous other occasions (it is, therefore, reasonable to
conclude, based on contemporary defense plans, that there is an imminent threat that such weapons will be used in the immediate future);
(4) the acts of civil resistance historically served as a catalyst for
needed social change in the United States (it is, therefore, reasonable
to believe that such acts can eradicate the nuclear threat); and (5) the
use of the necessity defense to justify protests against nuclear weapons
has not been statutorily excluded. Defendants typically testify in their
own behalf. In addition, they usually call experts on international law,
defense policy, history of social movements, and those who have experienced or studied nuclear terror to testify. These experts offer
testimony which supports the reasonableness of the defendants' be317
liefs.

315. Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d 457, 461 (1982). The early application and
extension of the necessity defense to justify prison escapes suggested that the defense might
be invoked in the future by those claiming the right to violate the law deliberately in order to
protest, call attention to, or to bring about a change in social conditions or political policies.
See People v. Lovercamp, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974). The recognition of the defense of necessity
for those escaping from prison was an express effort by the judiciary to promote prison reform.
See People v. Harmon, 220 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1974).
316. See generally Erica Luckstead, Choice of Evils Defenses in Texas: Necessity, Duress,
and Public Duty, 10 AM. J. CRIM. L. 179, 181 (1982).
317. See Aldridge & Stark, supra note 314.
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Prosecutors countered this new, sophisticated defense with several
tactics. Various civil resisters were zealously prosecuted to deter
others from engaging in such activities. For instance, the "Plowshares
3
Pruning Hooks" defendants were indicted and convicted of sabotage. 1s
However, the standard practice in civil resistance cases is to reduce
or drop charges to prevent defendants from claiming the right to a
jury trial.319 Prosecutors also pioneered the application of the motion
in limine in civil resistance cases. This motion was used to obtain
pre-trial rulings which barred defendants from relying upon various
defenses and arguments at trial and enabled the government to discover defense strategies and witnesses.32 0 In addition, prosecutors and
police agencies engaged in ethically questionable practices, which included infiltration of religious groups by informants. 321 In other inwrongstances, the government was accused of serious misconduct and
3
doing in pursuing prosecutions against political dissidents. 2
Nevertheless, civil resisters managed to achieve a number of significant victories at the state trial court level. 3 - Trial court decisions
which upheld defendants' reliance upon the necessity defense generally
are unreported and have limited precedential value. 3 - Their major
importance is to inspire others to engage in acts of civil resistance
and to invoke the necessity defense.- = The importance of these victories at the trial court level is further diminished by appellate, state
and federal courts which uniformally rejected defendants' reliance upon
the necessity defense and affirmed their convictions.3 26 Thus, the only
generally available written judicial discussions on application of the
necessity defense in cases which involve civil resistance to nuclear

318. 797 F.2d at 584-88. The government singled out high profile defendants for prosecution
in Selective Service cases, see Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
319. See BOYLE, supra note 308, at 18. See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 F.2d 145
(1968). For the possible abuse of the denial of jury trials for "petty offenses," see Frank v.
United States, 395 U.S. 147, 153 (1969) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
320. See generally Douglas Colbert, The Motion in Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases:
Silencing the Defendant at Trial, 39 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1987). See also Colbert, supra note
254, at 5.
321. 883 F.2d at 697-705.
322. See United States v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 389 (D.S.D. 1974) (judgment of acquittal
based upon governmental misconduct).
323. See Aldridge & Stark, supra note 314, at 316-26.
324. Joel H. Levitin, Putting the Government on Trial: The Necessity Defense and Social
Change, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 221, 1224 (1987).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1223.
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weapons reject its applicability.327 The importance of these cases transcends the issue of the justifiability of protests against nuclear weapons.
They establish principles which control the disposition of future claims
by individuals who are justified to act to prevent internationally illegal
and potentially harmful policies of the United States government.
C.

The Necessity Defense

The judiciary's mechanical application of the necessity defense in
nuclear protest cases is reminiscent of the analysis employed by
nineteenth century judges to justify decisions which upheld the institution of slavery. 328 The appellate decisions which rejected the use of
the necessity defense concluded that a nuclear exchange is not sufficiently immediate or imminent to invoke the necessity defense; the
protesters' acts are not calculated to eliminate the threatened harm;
there are available legal channels through which to change government
policy; and Congress precluded reliance upon the necessity defense in
329
protests against nuclear weapons.
Courts have conceded that a nuclear war is a more serious harm
than the illegal, but generally peaceful actions of anti-nuclear protesters.33° However, courts have ruled that the threat of nuclear war is
not imminent and, thus, does not create a necessity for individuals to
act to prevent it from occurring. In People v. Weber,-' the defendants
trespassed onto and blocked sidewalks and streets in front of General
Dynamics and the U.S. Navy Submarine Base at Ballast Point, California.' Judge Milkes rejected the defendants' argument that their actions were required to avert a nuclear war. He concluded that "necessity is not a cause or a potentiality. It must be articulable to an
immediate, imminent fear and compulsion."Since the threat of nuclear war is not imminent, Judge Milkes
noted that the defendants had available, legal avenues of redress.-

327.

Id. at 1224.

328.

See ROBERT M. COVER,

JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL

PROCESS (1975). Necessity arguably is a flexible doctrine. See Miller v. Monsen, 37 N.W.2d
543, 545 (Minn. 1949), cited in Aldridge & Stark, supra note 314, at 310.
329. See infra notes 331-53.
330. United States v. Quilty, 741 F.2d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir. 1984).
331. 208 Cal. Rptr. 719.
332. Id. at 720.
333. Id. at 721. Judge Milkes recognized that some view a nuclear holocaust as a matter
of survival. But, in an ambiguous retort, he wrote that "it is equally arguable that hunger, pain
and shelter are to those in need, similarly issues of survival." Id.

334.

Id.
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The judiciary, in the anti-nuclear weapons cases, stressed that necessity is a response to an emergency situation and may not be invoked
by defendants who have the luxury to select from alternative courses
of action.- 5 The fact that defendants are impatient with "less visible
and more time-consuming alternatives" does not constitute a legal
necessity to act.3- In United States v. Quilty,'- the defendants entered
the Rocky Island Arsenal and conducted an anti-nuclear prayer service.m The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the defendants had legal avenues available to express their opposition to
nuclear weapons. It noted that there "are thousands of opportunities
for the propagation of the anti-nuclear message: in the nation's electoral process; by speech on public streets, in parks, in auditoriums,
in churches and lecture halls, and by the release of information to the
media, to name only a few. '' 39
Defendants, in the view of the judiciary, not only possess reasonable legal alternatives through which to articulate their point of view,
they also may select a means not calculated to avert a nuclear
holocaust. In United States v. Montgomery,~° eight members of the
"Pershing Plowshares" group entered the Martin Marietta Aerospace
Corporation defense plant in Orlando, Florida. They hammered and
poured blood onto both nuclear and conventional missile launchers and
components belonging to the United States Army, hung banners, and
distributed pictures and documents which condemned nuclear
weapons. They remained on the premises singing and praying until
they were arrested for conspiracy and destruction of Army policy.- 1
The Court ruled that the defendants "could not hold a reasonable
belief that a direct consequence of their actions would be nuclear
In Commonwealth v. Berrigan,-3 the appellees endisarmament."
tered a General Electric plant in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, destroyed missile components with hammers, poured human blood on
the premises and caused some twenty-eight thousand dollars in property damage.3- The plant only produced nuclear shell casings, and the

335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 431 (9th Cir. 1985).
Id.
741 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1033.
Id.
772 F.2d at 733.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 736.
501 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1985).
Id. at 228.
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that the "process of manufacture
is so far removed from the ultimate question of use as to be pure
conjecture and speculation and presents, at most, a non-imminent
danger."345 Thus, the appellees' actions could not "under any hypothesis
reasonably be expected to be effective in avoiding the perceived public
''
disaster of a nuclear holocaust. 1-6
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also noted that since the manufacture of nuclear shell casings for nuclear warheads is legal, "it is
the type of conduct to which the Legislature has spoken in excluding
the justification defense. '' 347 Judge Wieand, concurring and dissenting
in the Superior Court decision in Berrigan,34 concluded that the "law
pertaining to justification as a defense to criminal conduct does not
permit a court or jury to overrule a properly made Congressional
determination regarding the use of nuclear power for national defense. " 9
Courts concluded that since the defendants failed to satisfy one or
more of the elements of the necessity defense, it was unnecessary to
determine the international legality of nuclear weapons. As a result,
appellate courts generally affirmed trial court rulings which excluded
the testimony of international law experts.3 5 The judiciary emphasized
that it was unwilling to permit defendants to raise a criminal defense
which would permit them to litigate indirectly the international legality
of nuclear weapons. In Kabat,35 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that the defendants "would have lacked standing to bring a
private suit challenging U.S. nuclear weapons policies, and they cannot
by first committing crimes avoid the requirement that to invoke judicial authority they show an injury beyond that shared by all citizens."aIn general, the judiciary has harshly penalized civil resisters. Even
sympathetic judges have explained that the moral potency of the defendants' cause and motivation does not "alter the duty" of the courts

345. Id. at 230.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 230 n.5.
348. Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 472 A.2d 1099, 1118 (Pa. 1984) (Wiend, J., concurring and
dissenting).
349. Id. at 1124.
350. United States v. Cassidy, 616 F.2d 101-02 (4th Cir. 1979). See generally United States
v. Komisaruk, 885 F.2d 490, 496-97 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 453-54
(2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Patz, 584 F.2d 927, 931 (9th Cir. 1978).
351. 797 F.2d at 580.
352. Id. at 592.
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to enforce the law.A In Weber,- a California appellate court remanded
the case to the trial court with directions to set aside the six-month
sentences meted out to three of the defendants convicted of trespass
and obstruction of a street or sidewalk.3 The trial court judge stated
that he viewed the defendants misdemeanor protests as constituting
the felonious and immoral "theft" of the time of the court, the police
and General Dynamics.- The trial court judge concluded by warning
the defendants that "[f]or war the price is often times death."3 7 In
Kabat,m the four members of "Silo Pruning Hooks" were sentenced
to terms which ranged from eight to eighteen years in prison plus
other penalties. Judge Bright, in his dissent, 359 observed that
the protest activities in this case injured no one and did not,
and could not damage the missile capability at the missile
site. The sentences are akin to penalties often imposed on
violent criminals, such as robbers and rapists, or on those
3
guilty of crimes considered heinous, such as drug dealers. 60
D.

Reformulation of the Necessity Defense

Those who engaged in traditional Gandhian civil disobedience,
openly violate the law, accept their guilt and accept their punishment.
Civil resisters who invoke the necessity defense, in contrast, claim
their formally illegal acts of protest are legally justifiable. Thus far,
appellate courts have ruled the necessity defense to be inapplicable,
as a matter of law, and, therefore, does not justify acts of civil resistance against nuclear weapons. 361 However, the interests of democracy

353. 741 F.2d at 1034-52.
354. 208 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
355. Id. at 723. The Superior Court concluded that the sentencing Judge's equation of
"three thefts together with the inconvenience to the court as equaling felonies was an improper
standard for sentencing." Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. See also State v. Wentworth, 395 A.2d 858, 865 (1978) (conviction for criminal
trespass at a nuclear power plant). Harsh sentences are required to deter morally motivated
defendants.
358. 797 F.2d at 580.
359. Id. at 592.
360. Id. at 594; see generally United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1981)
(Boochever, J., commenting on terms of probation which restricted the appellants First Amendment rights).
361. Francis A. Boyle, InternationalLaw, Citizen Resistance, and Crimes by the State The Defense Speaks, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 45, 350 (1989).
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and public accountability call for a relaxation of necessity defense
requirements to accommodate nonviolent, proportionate acts of civil
resistance directed against large-scale violations of human rights and
threats to human life.
The judiciary's rigid approach to the necessity defense overlooks
the fact that the necessity defense was intended to be a flexible doctrine which could be employed to mitigate the harshness of the criminal
law.362 The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Bailey,36
recognized the fluid nature of the defense when, in attempting to
explain the precise elements of the defense, it observed "we find
ourselves in a position akin to that of the mother crab who is trying
to teach her progeny to walk in a straight line, and finally in desper'
ation exclaims: 'Don't do as I do, do as I say.' 6
The imminence test, as applied by the courts, virtually precludes
application of the necessity defense in cases of nonviolent, proportionate political protest. In determining "imminence," courts should not
require instantaneous harm. Imminence should be determined by
balancing the severity of the harm and likelihood of its occurrence
against the harm created by the defendant's criminal act. The more
severe the potential harm, the less strictly the imminence standard
should be interpreted. The necessity defense should be given a particularly liberal interpretation when human life is threatened and, in such
cases, should be sufficient when the harm is reasonably foreseeable.3
A nuclear exchange, arguably, is reasonably likely given contemporary
arsenals and strategic doctrines; and the devastation which accompanies a nuclear war is greatly in excess of the harm caused by acts
of civil resistance. Human rights violations, such as those in Latin
America, are ongoing and severe and should satisfy the harm prong
of the necessity defense. Although such violations are not strictly
immediate, it should be sufficient that the protest was directed against
a site which symbolically represented the harm they sought to alleviate .
The essence of the necessity defense is to balance the harm sought
to be averted against the harm created by the defendant's criminal
act. The central question is whether a jury will ratify the defendant's

362. See Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 14, 729, affd sub nom., American Print Works v.
Lawrence, 23 N.J.L. 90 (1851).
363. 444 U.S. 392 (1980).
364. Id. at 397.
365. See Aldrich v. Wright, 53 N.H. 398, 403 (1873).
366. See generally Lawrence P. Tiffany & Carl A. Anderson, Legislating the Necessity
Defense in Criminal Law, 52 DENV. U. L. REV. 39, 854 (1975).
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choice of values - do they view the social utility of the defendant's
action as outweighing the harm sought to be averted? The imminence
requirement was designed to insure that the defendant acted in good
faith to avoid a concrete, anticipated evil. In cases of severe, foreseeable public evils, the potential harm is clear. Imminence should not
be interpreted as a rigid threshold requirement which prevents political protesters from presenting their grievances to a jury of their
peers. The social costs of inaction may far outweigh incidental harm
367
created by nonviolent acts of civil resistance.
The case for relaxing the imminency requirement is even more
compelling in instances where the evil the protesters are attempting
to remedy or prevent is reasonably believed to violate international
law. In such cases, protesters act to uphold rather than violate the
law .3 The fact that defendants are to face criminal charges guarantees
the necessary degree of adversarialness to satisfy the standing requirement. 69 In addition, it is unlikely that a jury's general verdict in a
criminal case will embarrass or interfere with United States foreign
policy. An acquittal merely will establish that the jury ratified the
reasonableness of the defendant's actions.37 In any event, while the
choice between competing foreign policies is a political decision, the
legality of such policies is subject to judicial determination.371
Courts also ruled that defendants, as a matter of law, possess
available, effective legal alternatives. The existence of such alternatives should be established as a matter of fact, rather than mechanically
determined to exist as matter of law. Unfortunately, our textbook
views of democracy often do not fully correspond to social reality.
Decisions, particularly in the area of foreign and defense policy, often
are undertaken with limited public debate or consultation.72 In addition, citizens often lack the resources, time and skill to impact public
policy. A lack of success may indicate their views have not been heard,
rather than rejected. Clearly, another letter always can be written,
an additional vote cast or demonstration organized. It should be sufficient, as a threshold requirement, that individuals are able to dem-

367. See generally Glanville Williams, The Defense of Necessity, 6 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
216, 223-24 (1953).
368. Boyle, supra note 361, at 350.
369. Frank Lawrence, The Nuremberg Principles: A Defense for Political Protesters, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 97, 424 (1989).
370. Id. at 419-21.
371. Id. at 421.
372. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in
Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran Contra Affair, 71 YALE L. REV. 1071 (1985).
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onstrate a history of good faith, legal efforts to reform the policy
which is the focus of their protests. This would attest to the sincerity
of the defendant's beliefs and actions. It is not unreasonable to conclude
that individuals, at some point, have exhausted their avenues of legal
373
redress.
The requirement that there is a direct causal relationship between
the defendant's act and harm to be averted virtually insures that the
necessity defense is unavailable to those who engage in nonviolent
acts of criminal protest.3 74 Acts of nonviolent protest historically have
served as a catalyst for social change in the United States.3 75 They
focused attention on issues, provoked debate, influenced public opinion
and mobilized popular action. Thus, the action of protesters, in conjunction with the actions of others, may lead to social change.376 Obviously,
the more complex and serious the harm, the less likely it is that an
individual's act of protest will be successful in averting the harm. To
require success is to preclude the use of the necessity defense in the
case of large-scale threats. It would appear reasonable to consider the
act requirement of the necessity defense to be satisfied by public,
nonviolent acts of protest, reasonably calculated to direct public attention to a situation reasonably perceived to pose a significant social
harm.
The legislative preemption argument also has been mechanically
applied to prevent defendants from relying upon the necessity defense.
Courts should require a plain and explicit legislative statement which
precludes the use of the necessity defense before making such a determination. Such a legislative purpose should not be implied from the
mere fact that the legislature adopted a particular legislative scheme
or public policy.377 In any event, a defendant has an inherent right to
rely upon the defense of necessity to protect human life, and this right
cannot be abrogated by legislative determination.378
By refusing to permit defendants to rely upon the necessity defense, courts are denying defendants the opportunity to have the justifiability of their actions evaluated by a jury of their peers. Professor

373. Aldridge & Stark, supra note 314, at 334-35. For an extreme version of the exhaustion
requirement, see 447 A.2d at 777-78 (defendants did not exhaust all alternatives prior to trespassing into churches and opening the doors to the homeless).
374. Peter Weiss & Anne Simon, Connecticut v. Drummy: Briefof Amici Curiae, 45 GUILD
PRAC. 36, 42 (1988).
375. 797 F.2d at 592, 601 (Bright, J., dissenting).
376. 472 A.2d at 1115 (Spaeth J., concurring).
377. See generally Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 471 A.2d 462, 475-79 (Pa. 1984).
378. See Williams, supra note 367, at 224.
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Francis Boyle argues that those who engage in putative criminal acts
of nonviolent resistance have a constitutional right to rely on those
statutory and common law defenses that are generally made available
to other criminal defendants.3 79 Boyle points out that even alleged
murderers, robbers, and rapists are entitled to the "presumption of
innocence, a vigorous defense, and all the protections of due process
of law. Society's standards and expectation should be no less for those
who have engaged in nonviolent resistance activities designed to prevent
the ongoing commission of international and domestic crimes ...
In Bailey,381 Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent 2 that:
.

Ruling on a defense as a matter of law and preventing the
jury from considering it should be a rare occurrence in
criminal cases . . . . The jury is the conscience of society
and its role in a criminal prosecution is particularly important
... . The case for recognizing the duress or necessity defenses is even more compelling when it is society, rather
than private actors, that creates the coercive conditions. In
such a situation, it is especially appropriate that the jury be
permitted to weigh all the factors and strike the balance
between the interests of prisoners and that of society. In an
attempt to conserve the jury for cases it considers truly
worthy of that body, the Court has ousted the jury from a
role it is particularly well suited to serve.VII.

CIVIL RESISTANCE IN THE NEXT DECADE:
A DARING NEW PERSPECTIVE

The judiciary, then, should recognize the necessity defense for civil
resisters who act in a nonviolent, proportionate fashion to defend their
own human rights and the human rights of others. Defendants who
seek to rely upon this right of "political self defense" should be required
to demonstrate:8 1) a reasonable belief that a severe harm or evil is

379. Boyle, supra note 361, at 350.
380. Id. at 351.
381. 444 U.S. at 392.
382. Id. at 419.
383. Id. at 435. See also Edward B. Arnolds & Norman F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity
in Criminal Law: The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289,
296 (1974).
384. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offenses
Exemption in Extradition - A Proposed Juridical Standardfor an Unruly Problem, 10 DEPAUL L. REV. 217, 255 (1969).
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imminent or reasonably foreseeable. The fact that a harm or evil is
reasonably believed to be violative of domestic or international law is
relevant in the determination of the severity of the harm or evil; 2)
the harm created by the defendant's action is reasonably believed to
be less than that which results from the harm or evil that they are
attempting to avert. However, injury to others is never justified; 3)
the defendant's act is reasonably believed to be calculated to directly
or indirectly avert the harm. The defendant's action is not required
to completely prevent the harm which they are attempting to prevent;
4) the defendant must reasonably believe there are no available, effective alternative courses of legal redress. The fact that the defendant
is able to demonstrate a history of good faith efforts to change the
policy which is the object of their protest is sufficient to satisfy this
element of the defense; and 5) the legislature has not explicitly precluded the necessity defense in this specific situation.
The judiciary, by denying defendants the opportunity to rely upon
the necessity defense, implicitly adopted a political stance in support
of the status quo. It has been argued that the United States, which
was founded by revolution, replaced the old and discarded doctrine of
the divine right of kings with a new theory. This theory posits that
"the self-correcting procedures under the constitution obviate the
need, and therefore abolish the citizens' right to resort to extra-legal
measures of reform. '" In societies, such as the United States, which
view themselves as having "discovered the ideal utopian socio-political
order or the ideal procedures for attaining such order, the political
offender has no redeeming social value. He appears from time to time
merely as an apparition to challenge the perfection of those in
power.''3 Despite the judiciary's tendency to dismiss civil resisters
as self-indulgent moralists, the fact remains that when permitted to
rely upon the necessity defense, most have been acquitted by a jury
7
of their peers.The interests in democratic debate and decision-making dictate
that courts flexibly interpret the necessity defense and permit the
defense to be invoked by political protesters who nonviolently attempt
to protect human rights. A humane, democratic society should resolve
moral and political conflict through dialogue and debate and practice
individualized justice. Professor Laurence Tribe argues that when con-

385.

Nicholas N. Kittrie, Patriots and Terrorists:Reconciling Human Rights With World

Order, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 291, 295 (1981).

386.
387.

Id.
Boyle, supra note 361, at 352.
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fronted with cases involving controversial issues over which there is
no clear social consensus, courts should adopt procedures which facilitate a full debate.3 Tribe observes that it
would not seem a usurpation for courts to identify particular
areas of moral and social flux; to hold that these areas are
not characterized by normative agreement sufficient to warrant their continued codification in the form of binding and
determinate rules; and to insist as a matter of due process
in the formation (formulation and application) of law, that
disputes in such areas must be resolved without resort to
mechanical rules.3 9
It is ingenious to argue that judicial relaxation of the necessity
defense, in cases involving nonviolent, proportionate action in defense
of human rights, will lead to anarchy. 3- Those concerned about rampant lawlessness might best devote their energies to controlling violent
crime and international aggression. Few individuals have sufficient
moral commitment to submit voluntarily to the costs, pressures and
demands of arrest and trial, and risk rejection of the necessity defense
and a possible criminal conviction. 391 It must be remembered that those
political protesters who invoke the necessity defense do not assert the
prerogative to obey whatever laws they believe are "just." They act
to compel the government to abide by its constitutional obligation to
obey the dictates of international law. Civil resistance is necessary to
counter the ideological indoctrination and psychic numbing which helps
to account for societal indifference towards large scale violations of
human rights. 3 - In many cases, civil resisters act to protect the human
rights of those abroad who do not have access to political avenues to
redress their grievances. 393 The benefits of civil resistance far outweigh

388. Lawrence Tribe, StructuralDue Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 311 (1975).
389. Id. at 310.
390. See Comment, Political Protest and the Illinois Defense of Necessity, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1070, 1089-91 (1987).
391. There are powerful psychological and sociological factors which compel most people to
quietly conform. See R. Lance Shotland & Lynne L. Goodstein, The Role of Bystanders in
Crime Control, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 9 (1984).
392. See ROBERT JAY LIFTON & ERIC MARKUSEN, THE GENOCIDAL MENTALITY: NAZI
HOLOCAUST AND NUCLEAR THREAT (1990).
393. See State v. McCann, 541 A.2d 75 (Vt. 1987) (protest against United States policy in
Central America).
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the incidental social costs created by their activities.3 - It only will
enhance respect for the legal system if courts, rather than defer to
the political branches of government, provide a forum for the articulation of defendants' factual and legal contentions.395
The adjudication of civil resistance cases can be used to transform
the courtroom into a forum for a "teach-in," a "judicial town-meeting"
on the issues of the day. The rules of evidence and standards of judicial
decorum will guarantee the orderly and effective presentation of opposing views. These judicial "town-meetings" can be used to educate the
public, to encourage democratic debate, and to measure popular opinion on public policy questions.
The judiciary, despite fears of politicalization, is accustomed to
litigating political issues. In fact, under international extradition
treaties, the federal judiciary has jurisdiction over the determination
of political offender status. Those who qualify as political offenders,
in accordance with the terms of virtually all, bilateral extradition
treaties, may not be extradited to stand trial in the requesting countryA9 In 1981, for instance, a federal magistrate determined that a
member of the Irish Republic Army charged with attempted murder
of a British soldier in Northern Ireland was a political offender.3 The
political offense exception, in part, is based on a recognition that
individuals have an inherent right to resort to political activism, including the limited use of violence, to achieve political change.3 9s Thus,
the political offense exception reflects a "modern consensus" that political crimes are distinct from and possess greater legitimacy than do
common crimes.39 As a result, political offenders are to be accorded
special protections and are not to be returned to stand trial in a
country where they face the possibility of persecution or an unfair
judicial proceeding.40° It is paradoxical that the United States provides

394. The rationales for the law not imposing a duty to rescue, for the most part, are
administrative - the social costs of imposing a duty on the inept and unskilled and the risk of
placing third parties in peril. These costs do not arise in cases of civil resistance. See Ernest
J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980).
395. For an advocacy of an active judicial role in the enforcement of international law, see
Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and InternationalLaw, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071 (1985).

396. See generally, Valerie Epps, The Validity of the PoliticalOffender Exception in Extradition Treaties in Anglo American Jurisprudence,20 HARV. INTL L.J. 61 (1979).

397. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1981).
398. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 1986), quoting and citing Note, American Courts and Modem Terrorism: The Politics of Extradition, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.

617, 622 (1981).
399. 783 F.2d at 793.
400. Id.
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a safe-haven to often violent foreign political offenders, while denying
domestic, nonviolent, civil resisters an opportunity to present their
factual and legal claims in a court of law. Those resisters in prison
are domestic political offenders who, in the eyes of the global community, may be -appropriately viewed as political prisoners of con0
science.4 1
The special status conferred upon political offenders also reflects
an appreciation of the dynamic character of social values and public
policies. 4°- Today, we imprison individuals who protest policies which,
in the future, may be viewed as barbarous and antediluvian. In retrospect, it is clear that individuals would have been morally justified to
engage in acts of civil resistance to halt the internment of the Japanese
during World War 11.403 Yet, this policy was endorsed by both the
executive and legislative branches; received public support; and was
proclaimed as legal by the United States Supreme Court. 4 Civil resisters confront society with views which it may not be entirely prepared to accept. Civil resisters are the guardians of those fundamental
democratic freedoms and principles which society frequently is willing
to unthinkingly compromise in the interests of societal stability or
national security. 40 5 Judge Bright observed in Kabat that civil disobedience has been vital to social progress and reform:
We must recognize that civil disobedience in various forms,
used without violent acts against others, is ingrained in our
society and the moral correctness of political protesters'

401. On the right to rebellion under international law, see Jordon J. Paust, Aggression
Against Authority: The Crime of Oppression, Politicide and Other Crimes Against Human
Rights, 18 EMORY L.J. 283, 297-98 (1986). The Statute of Amnesty Internationalin art. 1(b)
recognizes as political prisoners those who are detained pursuant to procedures that do not
conform to internationally recognized norms. Statute of Amnesty International, in AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1989 288 (1989). These internationally
recognized norms certainly include the right to present a defense. See generally International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 14, G.A. Res. 217 (111), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (opened for signature, Dec. 19, 1966;
entered into force, March 23, 1976) (signed by the United States, Dec. 31, 1979).
402. The acceptance of moral pluralism has been identified as central in explaining the
formal recognition of political crime. See B.L. Ingraham & Kazuhiko Tokoro, Political Crime
in the United States and Japan: A Comparative Study, 4 ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 145, 153
(1969).
403. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
404. See generally JACOBUS TENBROEK, EDWARD N. BARNHART & FLOYD W. MATSON,
PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1954).
405. Civil rights and liberties are particularly vulnerable during wartime. See MICHAEL
LINFIELD, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: U.S. CIVIL LIBERTIES IN TIMES OF WAR (1990).
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views has on occasion served to change and better our society. Civil disobedience has been prevalent throughout this
nation's history extending from the Boston Tea Party and
the signing of the Declaration of Independence, to the freeing
of the slaves by operation of the underground railroad in
the mid-1800's. More recently, disobedience of "Jim Crow"
laws served, among other things, as a catalyst to end segregation by law in this country, and violation of selective service laws contributed to our eventual withdrawal from the
Viet Nam [sic] War. 406
The early common law recognized the authority of private individuals to arrest wrongdoers. In fact, until "quite modern times police
duties were the duties of every man. '' 407 This system of private law
enforcement, in part, reflected the lack of effective, organized police
forces.40s In the contemporary era, the global society lacks strong
international mechanisms to enforce the requirements of international
law. The civil resister merely replicates the original common law model
and acts to prevent criminal activity. The case for private law enforcement, of course, is even greater when it is the State, with its vast
resources, which systematically violates human rights. In the long
run, a refusal to permit civil resisters to present a constitutionally
recognized defense may succeed to discourage acts of civil resistance.
However, in the end, this may "prove to be detrimental to the maintenance of peace and good order in the community." ' 409
The necessity defense specifically has been recognized as a justification for an act of rebellion. In 1834, in United v. Ashton, 410 Justice
Story ruled that sailors had a right under maritime law to resist their
commanding officer's order to proceed into a storm. 4 1 He stated that,
in such a situation, the law considers the lives of persons far more
valuable than property.41 2 It is clear, Story concluded, that "the crew
had a right to resist, and to refuse obedience. It is a case of justifiable
self-defense against an undue exercise of power.'4 13 Those who man

406. 797 F.2d at 601.
407. Jerome Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L.
REV. 566, 579 (1936).
408. Id. at 579-85.
409. Stevenson v. State, 413 A.2d 1340, 1349 (1980).
410. 24 F. Cas. 873 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 14,470).
411. Id. at 874.
412. Id.
413. Id.
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the ship are not obligated to proceed merely because their chief officer
4 14
has exercised the "rashness of judgement to proceed.'
The judiciary has morally and psychologically distanced itself from
the issues raised by civil resisters. Judges, rather than analyze
whether civil resisters may validly invoke the necessity defense,
mechanically cited existing precedents to deny civil resisters the use
of the defense.415 It is ironic that, in rejecting the applicability of the
necessity defense, judges frequently invoke "the fact" that legal
mechanisms exist in the American democratic system to effect social
change.416 Thus, while preventing defendants from raising issues of
governmental abuse and illegality, the judiciary ironically emphasized
freedom and liberty available in the United States. One state court
judge observed that protesters were denied the use of the necessity
defense "merely because they express unpopular views.' 4 17 Judge
Bright, dissenting in Kabat,418 is the only federal appellate judge who
forthrightly challenged the judiciary's refusal to acknowledge the political, moral and religious imperatives which motivate acts of civil resistance. 41 9 Judge Bright reminded his colleagues that which "has distinguished our society from other countries whose governments are described as repressive is that our government has been able to limit
its response to this sort of protest which, it must be specifically noted,
is nonviolent as to persons." 2 ° Miles Lord, the retired Chief Judge of
the United States District Court of Minnesota, is the other federal
judge who voiced misgivings concerning the judiciary's unwillingness
to acknowledge the vital moral claims articulated by civil resisters.
21
In 1984, he sentenced two civil resisters to six months probation.4
The protesters had hammered and poured blood on computers at
Sperry Inc., which caused thirty-six thousand dollars in damage. At
sentencing, Chief Judge Lord queried: "Can it be that those of us who
build weapons to kill are engaged in a more sanctified endeavor than
those who would by their acts attempt to counsel moderation and

414. Id.
415. An intelligent, reasoned presentation of the applicability of the necessity defense is
offered in Comment, Applying the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience Cases, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 9 (1989).
416. See supra notes 334-39 and accompanying texts.
417. State v. Warshow, 33 A.2d 1000, 1006 (1979) (Billings, J., dissenting).
418. 797 F.2d at 592.
419. Id. at 599.
420. Id. at 601.
421. United States v. LaForge & Katt, No. 4-84-66, slip at 20 (D. Minn. Nov. 8, 1984)
(sentencing), cited in 797 F.2d at 593 n.4.
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mediation as an alternative method of settling international disputes?"4
Scholars have beseeched the judiciary to recognize, or at least to
reconsider, the applicability of the necessity defense to cases of civil
resistance. 42 However, there is no indication that the judiciary took
the time and effort to carefully review and evaluate the history and
basic principles of the necessity defense. Instead, they continue to
merely mechanically cite precedents and dismiss the claims of civil
resisters. Unless there is an evident change in the judiciary's attitude,
judges of conscience, such as Judge Bright and Judge Lord, should
refuse to dignify civil resistance trials with their presence or participation. It is clear that token dissents, occasional probationary sentences, isolated state trial court decisions, and judicial statements in
support of civil resisters have had little impact to discourage prosecutions or change legal doctrine. These dissident judicial actions merely
reinforce the misconception that the judiciary can be persuaded
through intellectual appeals and reasoned argumentation. Judicial
abstention will serve as a symbolic protest against the refusal of judges
to recognize the applicability of the necessity defense to civil resistance
cases. Such abstention also will focus attention on the prosecution of
civil resisters and place pressure on prosecutors and judges to conduct
themselves during such trials in an objective and reasoned fashion.
Thus, rather than excuse themselves because of personal prejudice or
vested interest, judges should stand down to protest the inherent
political bias of their colleagues.4- This assertion of judicial conscience
is consistent with the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.Judges are to maintain and enforce high standards of conduct so as
to maintain the integrity and independence of the judiciary. 426 When
confronted by colleagues who are swayed by "partisan interests, public
clamor" and "fear of criticism," judges should, as is appropriate, ethically abstain.427

422.
423.

Id.
Charles R. Disalvo, Necessity's Child the Judiciary, Disobedience, and the Bomb, 41
U. MIAMI L. REV. 911 (1987).
424. The classic statement on the capacity of liberal democracy to co-opt dissent is HUBERT
MARCUSE ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL

SOCIETY

425.

(1968).

(1972).
Id. CANON 1.
427. Id. CANON 3(A)(1). However, a judge should abstain from public comment about a
pending or impending proceeding. Id. CANON (A)(6). See generally Bruce Ledewitz, An Essay
Concerning Judicial Resignation and Non-Cooperation in the Presence of Evil, 27 DUQ. L.
REV. 1 (1988).
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

426.
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This is more than a plea for a symbolic political protest. In The
Justice Trial, 42 a United States Military Tribunal recognized that the
judges and prosecutors who participated in the trial and punishment
of anti-Nazi protesters were themselves guilty of complicity in war
crimes. The Military Tribunal observed that "the laws, the Hitler
decrees and the draconic, corrupt, and perverted Nazi judicial system
themselves constituted the substance of war crimes and crimes against
humanity and that participation in the enactment and enforcement of
' '429
them amounts to complicity in crime.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Developments in technology confront humanity with unparalleled
threats which range from ecocide and genocide to nuclear war. It is
not the nonviolent rebel who threatens civilization; it is the compliant
conformist. The tendency of people to quietly conform to the dictates
of authority may have disastrous consequences - we may unwittingly
acquiesce in policies which propel us into long-term disaster. Stanley
Milgram concludes that the type of character produced in American
democratic society "cannot be counted on to insulate its citizens from
brutality and inhumane treatment at the direction of malevolent authority." 0 He sadly observes that a "substantial proportion of people
do what they are told to do, irrespective of the content of the act and
without limitations of conscience, so long as they perceive that the
command comes from legitimate authority. '' 4 3 1 It is this "fatal flaw
. . . which in the long run gives our species only a modest chance of

survival.

432

Despite their avowals of neutrality, the judiciary has unreasonably
refused to permit those who engage in nonviolent protest to attempt
to justify their actions before a jury of their peers. The prosecution,
conviction and incarceration of these civil resisters serves little purpose
other than to deter others from following their example. Ironically,
the historical record strongly suggests that those "sinners" we imprison today may be feted as "saints" tomorrow.
It is these morally autonomous individuals who provide a vital
check on the exercise of governmental power. 4- The Oliners, in their

428. The Justice Trial, 4 L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n
American Mil. Trib. Nuremberg, Germany 1947).
429. Id. at 49.
430. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1969).
431. Id. at 189.
432. Id. at 188.
433. Id.
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study of those who assisted the Jewish victims of the Holocaust, observe that such people "assure us that people can shape their own
destinies rather than merely stand by as passive witnesses to fate or
to allow themselves to become nothing more than victimized objects."434
Albert Camus urges us to remember that "on this earth there are
pestilences and there are victims, and it's up to us, so far as possible,
not to join forces with the pestilences . . . .

434.

SAMUEL OLINER & PEARL M. OLINER, THE ALTRUISTIC PERSONALITY: RES-
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